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Abstract
This dissertation aimed to inform a cognitive vulnerability-stress theory of mania, which
addresses both the content and structure of the self-schema, along with the conditions under
which these self-relevant cognitions are activated. Extant research on mania has primarily
considered self-schema content, or an individual’s actual beliefs (e.g., “I am incompetent”).
Although these investigations have successfully identified maladaptive self-beliefs associated
with bipolar disorder, this research has been prone to inconsistencies and limited in
distinguishing between mania and related forms of psychopathology (e.g., unipolar
depression). Furthermore, very little research on mania has considered the organization of
self-schema beliefs, referred to here as self-schema structure. Accordingly, three studies of
non-clinical samples examined self-schema structure, as well as content, in relation to mania
risk (i.e., the Hypomanic Personality Scale). To address other assumptions of a cognitive
vulnerability-stress model, the importance of mood priming and potential interactions
between self-schema characteristics and life events were also explored. Results indicate that
mania risk is associated with several types of self-schema content, including dysfunctional
attitudes about achievement, multidimensional perfectionism, and obsessive passion. Some
of these characteristics (e.g., cognitive distortions) showed greater relevance for depressive
versus manic symptoms. Conversely, there was a distinct pattern of results for self-schema
structure, in which mania risk and symptoms appear to correspond with highly
interconnected, positive self-schema content. In particular, longitudinal findings suggest that
positive self-schema structure predicts prospective increases in manic symptoms. Notably,
mania risk also corresponded with greater temporal instability of self-schema structure. With
ii

respect to life events, measures of self-schema structure, but not content, interacted
with positive life events to predict the course of manic symptoms. Across the three studies,
findings were mixed as to whether certain domains (i.e., achievement or interpersonal) of
self-schema structure show distinct patterns in relation to mania. Further, mood priming did
not appear to play a significant role in the examination of self-schema characteristics.
Overall, the present findings suggest that the manic self-schema may contain a structural
component that predicts the course of manic symptoms and shows meaningful interactions
with life events. Future research directions and clinical implications are then discussed.
Keywords: mania, cognitive vulnerability-stress model, self-schema structure, selfschema content, life events, mood induction procedures.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Researchers have long been interested in how self-beliefs play a role in the development and
maintenance of psychological disorders. The cognitive vulnerability-stress model theorizes
that sources of ‘cognitive vulnerability’ (e.g., negative beliefs about oneself) lead to
psychological disorders (e.g., depression), when a person also experiences certain stressful
life events (e.g., social rejection). Limited research, however, informs a cognitive
vulnerability-stress model of mania (a feature of bipolar disorder). In particular, little is
known about how beliefs about the self may be organized. For example, if an individual’s
negative beliefs were highly interconnected, a situation triggering a negative thought (e.g.,
failing an exam and thinking “I am stupid”) would likely trigger a similar negative thought
(e.g., “No one will ever love me”). Therefore, if beliefs are more highly interconnected, a
larger emotional response would be triggered. Studying the organization of self-beliefs is
important, since evidence suggests that, at least in cases of depression, this is associated with
the severity of symptoms and occurrence of symptoms following negative life events. Thus,
this project examined both the nature and organization of self-beliefs associated with mania,
within community and university student samples. Participants fell along a continuum in
terms of their ‘risk for mania’; that is, whether they showed certain personality
features/experiences that have strongly predicted future development of (hypo)manic
episodes. Across three studies, it was found that individuals at higher risk for mania showed
unhelpful beliefs about goal attainment (e.g., “I need to excel at everything I do”),
perfectionistic attitudes, and obsessiveness regarding a valued activity. Notably, individuals
at high mania risk also displayed highly interconnected, positive self-beliefs. This
organizational pattern was associated with greater manic symptoms, particularly when
iv

higher-risk individuals also experienced certain positive events (e.g.,
achievements). Conversely, their actual beliefs did not predict manic symptoms following
these life events. Importantly, it appeared that the organization of self-beliefs among higherrisk individuals was subject to change over time, whereas this seemed stable among others.
Overall, these findings allude to the problematic organization of self-beliefs among
individuals at high risk for mania, which would correspond with unstable views and feelings
about oneself.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Bipolar disorder is one of the deadliest (Eroglu et al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2012) and most
debilitating (Mitchell et al., 2004) mental disorders, costing individuals more years of life and
productivity than heart attacks, epilepsy, dementia, and infectious disease (WHO, 2008). As one of
the most heritable psychiatric conditions (Edvardsen et al., 2008), researchers and clinicians have
historically emphasized the biological underpinnings of this disorder. However, in recent decades,
numerous investigations have demonstrated that psychosocial factors play a role in the onset and
maintenance of bipolar disorder (e.g., Alloy et al., 2005), and thus have important clinical
implications. As one illustration, the development of an evidence-based treatment for bipolar
disorder, family-focused therapy (FFT), was spurred by observations that unhelpful family dynamics
are predictive of relapse (for a review, see Peris & Miklowitz, 2015).
An inherent challenge to studying psychological vulnerability factors in bipolar disorder is
teasing apart features associated with mania, the hallmark of the illness, and depression, which is
often a facet of the disorder. This is an important consideration since evidence suggests that
vulnerability factors in depression and mania are separable, albeit correlated (e.g., genetic; McGuffin
et al., 2003). Moreover, greater understanding of the vulnerability factors differentially associated
with mania would be helpful from a treatment perspective. At present, psychological interventions in
cases of bipolar disorder are typically biased towards depressive symptoms, and it is less understood
how treatments might be beneficial for addressing manic symptoms (see Oud et al., 2016).
To further complicate the picture, expressions of mania can vary substantially across and
within individuals. This may range from a severe manic episode involving psychotic symptoms and a
need for hospitalization; to a hypomanic episode in which there is a clear change in an individual’s
mood and functioning without considerable impairment; to a display of manic symptoms (e.g.,
1

decreased need for sleep) or temperamental characteristics (e.g., hyper-confidence) that do not meet
diagnostic criteria for a mood episode. As such, this introduction first reviews the common features
and symptoms of mania, along with further considerations for operationalizing psychopathology,
prior to examining extant research on psychological vulnerability to mania.
Common Features and Symptoms of Mania
The bipolar spectrum disorders include bipolar I disorder (BD-I), bipolar II disorder (BD-II),
cyclothymic disorder, and subthreshold conditions (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
In this dissertation, the term ‘bipolar disorder’ is used to refer broadly to this family of disorders.
Diagnosis of a bipolar spectrum disorder hinges on the operationalization of manic and hypomanic
episodes. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013) has
characterized (hypo)manic episodes as reflecting a time-limited change from an individual’s usual
level of functioning, highlighting the episodic nature of manic-depressive illness that scholars as
early as Kraepelin (1921) have emphasized. Specifically, a manic episode is a discrete period of (i)
elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, coupled with (ii) goal-directed activity or energy (APA,
2013). These cardinal symptoms are accompanied by feelings of grandiosity, flight of ideas, physical
agitation, talkativeness/incomprehensibility, decreased need for sleep, and/or excessive engagement
in risky behaviours. Symptoms persist for the majority of a week or lead to hospitalization, and cause
individuals considerable distress or impairment. Hypomania, literally ‘less than mania’, is a milder
variant in which the same symptoms are present but are not severe enough to “markedly” interfere
with functioning (APA, 2013). There is also a lower threshold for the duration of hypomanic
episodes (i.e., four days).
Individuals may experience manic symptoms with psychotic features, such as moodcongruent hallucinations or delusions (e.g., believing one is strong enough to lift a car over their
head). In addition, certain diagnoses within the Bipolar and Related Disorders category of the DSM-5
2

also involve the presence of a major depressive episode (i.e., BD-II) or depressive symptoms (i.e.,
cyclothymic disorder). Thus, individuals who experience manic symptoms may also suffer episodes
of depressed mood or decreased interest/pleasure, changes in weight or appetite,
insomnia/hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation/retardation, decreased energy, feelings of
worthlessness or guilt, difficulty concentrating or indecisiveness, and thoughts of death or suicidal
behaviours (APA, 2013).
A Continuum of Manic Symptomatology
Milder expressions of mania strongly predict the development of more severe presentations
(e.g., Alloy et al. 2012a, 2012b; Berk et al., 2007), providing evidence that manic tendencies exist
along a spectrum of severity. Thus, examining diverse presentations of manic symptoms contributes
to a greater understanding of bipolar disorder (see Alloy et al., 2015). Accordingly, several measures
have been developed to assess risk for mania, including the Hypomanic Personality Scale (Eckblad
& Chapman, 1986) and General Behaviour Inventory (Depue, 1987). Specifically, these measures
evaluate tendencies towards subsyndromal manic symptoms and personality traits associated with
bipolar disorder. For instance, a widely used measure of mania risk, the Hypomanic Personality
Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), assesses a constellation of attributes in which individuals
appear gregarious, energetic, hyper-confident, intensely emotional, ambitious, and impulsive.
The validity of instruments assessing mania risk has been well supported by research
indicating that high scores on these measures have been robustly associated with future onset of
(hypo)manic episodes (Kwapil et al., 2000; Merikangas et al., 2007). To illustrate, one study found
that 73% of individuals who met a high cut-off score on the HPS developed diagnosable symptoms
of bipolar disorder over a 3-year follow-up period (Kwapil et al., 2000). Moreover, a burgeoning
literature indicates that measures of mania risk show robust associations with psychosocial predictors
of the course of manic symptoms (e.g., Alloy et al., 2008; Jones, Mansell & Waller, 2006; Mansell,
3

Rigby, Tai, & Lowe, 2008). The results of genetic research have also linked mania risk (as indexed
by the HPS) to several candidate genes that have been implicated in the onset of bipolar disorder
(Johnson, Carver, Joorman, & Cuccaro, 2015).
In addition, there are certain advantages to a sampling approach that utilizes mania risk, as
opposed to remitted diagnostic status, when studying vulnerability factors associated with bipolar
disorder (Johnson et al., 2015; Just, Abramson, & Alloy, 2001; Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, &
Franklin, 1981). In particular, the utilization of measures of mania risk allows for the examination of
vulnerability factors without confounding influences (e.g., physical health, lifestyle, medication) that
likely accompany a serious history of mental disorder. Thus, mania risk is a valuable construct to
examine, in order to advance knowledge concerning psychological vulnerability to bipolar disorder.
As such, measures of mania risk have been heavily utilized in studies of mania, including the use of
these measures to index risk for the future development of bipolar disorder while exploring potential
vulnerability mechanisms (e.g. Devlin, Johnson, & Gruber, 2015; Kim, Kwon, & Meyer, 2017;
Pornpattananangkul, Hu, & Nusslock, 2015).
Psychological Vulnerability Models of Mania
Extant psychological research on bipolar disorder has considered its relation to various
constructs, such as cognitive styles, affective processes, and life events, to name a few (Gruber et al.,
2008; Mann-Wrobel et al., 2011; Urošević et al., 2008). Within this area of study, the reward
sensitivity model of mania (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Johnson et al., 2012) has garnered substantial
research support and posits that individuals at risk for mania display a hypersensitive reward system,
also referred to as the behavioural activation system (BAS; Gray, 1970).
Reward Sensitivity and Bipolar Disorder
By definition, mania is a goal-driven state marked by increased energy, speed, and intense
emotion (APA, 2013). Thus, it follows that individuals who experience mania may differ from those
4

who do not in systems that govern motivation and reward. Depue and Iacono (1989) were the first to
draw a parallel between mania and the BAS when they observed that manic symptoms closely
resemble the theorized outputs of this system. The BAS is a biologically-based system that governs
‘approach’ behaviour in response to rewarding stimuli in the environment (Gray, 1970, 1990). Thus,
it has been described as a broadband system encompassing a number of cognitive and affective
processes that promote goal-directed activity. As such, there is considerable overlap between the
BAS and the trait of impulsivity (Corr, 2004; Gray, 1970). Reward-relevant stimuli or environmental
cues of goal-directed behaviour constitute the inputs of this system, whereas the various outputs of
this system include increased energy, activity, confidence, exploration, and interest in rewards
(Depue & Iacono, 1989; Gray, 1970, 1990). The sensitivity of the BAS may differ across individuals,
such that a hypersensitive BAS would reflect greater output given a certain level of input (Gray,
1970, 1990).
The results of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies utilizing self-report and/or behavioural
measures (i.e., experimental paradigms) of BAS sensitivity indicate that levels are elevated amongst
persons with bipolar disorder compared to healthy control participants (see Johnson et al., 2012, for a
review). Within this area of study, most compelling are findings that demonstrate the prognostic
value of BAS sensitivity. A number of longitudinal studies have indicated that BAS sensitivity
predicts: (i) the onset of bipolar spectrum disorder (Alloy et al. 2012a, 2012b), (ii) a more severe
course of bipolar disorder (Alloy et al., 2008, 2009; Meyer et al., 2001; Salavert et al., 2007), and
(iii) the transition to a more severe form of disorder (cyclothymia to BD-I, and BD-II to BD-I; Alloy
et al., 2012a, 2012b).
Related to BAS sensitivity is a more explicit discussion of goal-setting and attainment.
Available evidence suggests that persons with a history of manic symptoms, along with their healthy
family members, are overrepresented among highly accomplished, creative individuals (see Johnson,
5

2005, for a review). In particular, it appears that periods of subthreshold mania (e.g., hypomania,
premorbid state in BD-I) are associated with high levels of functioning (e.g., greater creativity,
enhanced interpersonal functioning, occupational success; e.g., Coryell et al., 1989; Jamison, 1996;
Kutcher, Robertson & Bird, 1998). One possible explanation is that bipolar disorder is associated
with a stable pattern of high goal-setting. Extremely optimistic life ambitions that are extrinsically
motivated (e.g., related to wealth, fame) rather than intrinsically motivated (e.g., maintaining close
relationships) have been noted among individuals with the disorder and those at risk for mania
(Gruber & Johnson, 2009; Johnson & Carver, 2006; Johnson, Eisner, & Carver, 2009).
In addition, a number of studies have found that individuals with bipolar disorder exhibit a
distinct pattern of responding to success. Evidence suggests that the majority of people in the general
population exhibit ‘coasting’, or a short-term reduction in effort towards further goals once a goal has
been attained (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). Among persons diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, success has been associated with higher levels of activation and goal pursuit (Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). It appears that this pattern generalizes to individuals at risk for
bipolar disorder (Johnson 2005; Johnson et al., 2008b), and distinguishes between those with a high
versus low lifetime frequency of manic episodes (Wright, Lam, & Brown, 2008). Increased
engagement in goal pursuit has also prospectively predicted elevations in manic symptoms among
patients with BD-I, BD-II and cyclothymia (Alloy et al., 2009; Francis-Raniere, Alloy, & Abramson,
2006; Johnson, Carver, & Gotlib, 2012b; Lee, Lam, Mansell, & Farmer, 2010).
These persuasive results implicating reward and motivational processes in the aetiology of
bipolar disorder have frequently inspired research initiatives within different domains of study (e.g.,
Johnson, Carver, & Gotlib, 2012; Urošević et al., 2008). Of particular importance to the present
dissertation, this has included the study of cognitive characteristics associated with mania. These
relevant findings are described in more detail below.
6

Previous Research on Cognitive Vulnerability to Mania
Leahy and Beck (1988) originally posited that the ‘manic’ cognitive style would stand in
direct opposition to depressogenic cognition, and would thereby be marked by positively-biased
automatic thoughts, dysfunctional attitudes, and information processing. Studies that have examined
thinking styles within the context of positive mood states lend some support for this theory. In
particular, a history of (hypo)mania has been associated with high confidence in one’s abilities
following a success experience (e.g., Eisner et al., 2008) – a phenomenon referred to as ‘positive
overgeneralization’. Similarly, evidence suggests that individuals at a heightened risk for mania tend
to respond to positive affect with positive, self-focused rumination (Feldman et al., 2008; Gruber et
al., 2008b; Raes et al., 2010). This process describes personal reflection of one’s accomplishments
and aspirations, and has been prospectively related to a more severe course of manic symptoms
(Lam, Wright, & Sham, 2005). Of note, it has been proposed that these state-dependent cognitions
may reflect prodromal symptoms of (hypo)mania (e.g., Chen & Johnson, 2012; Fulford et al., 2009;
Wright et al., 2005).
Despite these findings, a burgeoning literature indicates that a negative cognitive style
underlies bipolar disorder, similar to unipolar depression. During depressive episodes, individuals
with bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder show the same negative attitudes about the self
(e.g., Hill et al., 1989, Rosenfarb et al., 1998). However, such a negative cognitive style is also
apparent during euthymic states. Compared to healthy control participants, individuals with bipolar
disorder in a euthymic state display biased recall of negative self-referent adjectives, more negative
inferential styles, higher levels of rumination, greater dysfunctional attitudes, and relatively little
positive self-referent information (e.g., Adams, Shapero, Pendergast, Alloy, & Abramson, 2014;
Jones et al., 2005, Scott et al., 2000, Van der Gucht et al., 2009), similar to individuals with unipolar
depression (e.g., Jones et al., 2005; Just & Alloy, 1997). Notably, research has demonstrated that
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concurrent depressive symptoms only partially mediate negative cognitive biases observed during
euthymic states, indicating that an underlying cognitive vulnerability exists in cases of bipolar
disorder that cannot be fully explained by mood state (Adams et al., 2014).
Moreover, although individuals with bipolar disorder continue to show negative cognitive
styles during (hypo)manic states (French et al., 1996), existing research suggests that certain forms of
negative cognitive content may reflect an underlying vulnerability towards depressive symptoms,
rather than manic symptoms, within the context of bipolar disorder. As one illustration, Johnson and
Fingerhut (2004) found that negative automatic thoughts predicted future depressive symptoms, but
not manic symptoms, over a 6-month follow-up.
Thus, within the bipolar disorder research literature, it is often unclear how cognitive
characteristics may be differentially associated with vulnerability towards mania versus depression.
One promising line of research has examined cognitive styles that may be prominent in light of the
reward sensitivity model of mania (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, et al., 2009; Chen & Johnson,
2012). Just as negative beliefs are relevant for depression, researchers have considered the relevance
of goal and achievement-related cognitions for mania. Indeed, evidence suggests that dysfunctional
beliefs related to goal-striving are associated with bipolar disorder (Alloy et al., 2009; Chen &
Johnson, 2012; Dodd et al., 2011a, 2011b; Lam et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2010). These include attitudes
that emphasize perfectionism, ambitious goal-striving, the ability to excel at anything, and the
importance of feeling positive and being active to avoid failure. Relatedly, dysfunctional attitudes
that emphasize achievement also appear to be overrepresented and stably present among persons
with bipolar disorder (Chen & Johnson, 2012; Lam et al., 2004; Lomax & Lam, 2010; Wright et al.,
2005). For instance, these individuals highly endorse beliefs that achievement is critical for one’s
self-worth and it is necessary for achievement to be recognized by others (Lam et al., 2004). Notably,
it has been demonstrated that dysfunctional attitudes about goal-striving and achievement are
8

apparent during euthymic states and among individuals at risk for mania (e.g., Lomax & Lam, 2010;
Wright, Lam, & Newsom Davis, 2005). Dysfunctional beliefs about goal attainment have also
distinguished individuals with bipolar disorder from those with unipolar depression during euthymic
states (Lam et al., 2004).
Summary of Contemporary Research on Cognitive Vulnerability to Mania
As illustrated in the above review, the research to date on cognitive vulnerability factors
associated with mania is somewhat disjointed and confusing, and at times even provides
contradictory findings. In addition, much of this research has stemmed from investigations focused
on other vulnerability factors associated with bipolar disorder, such as reward sensitivity. Although
these findings are generally informative, still missing is a more comprehensive examination of how
the cognitive constructs in this domain of research may operate in conjunction with other
vulnerability factors to give rise to mood symptomatology. A promising theoretical framework for
guiding this type of investigation is the cognitive vulnerability-stress model (e.g., Beck, 1967). This
model, which forms the fundamental underlying conceptual framework for the present dissertation, is
described in detail below.
The Cognitive Vulnerability-Stress Framework
The cognitive vulnerability-stress model is a prominent etiological framework that has had a
profound impact on the understanding and treatment of various psychological disorders (e.g.,
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 1967; Dodge, 1986; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Matthews, 1988). The theories that utilize this approach posit that latent, maladaptive cognitive
structures are activated by congruent environmental stressors, which, in turn, leads to the onset of
symptoms of mental disorders (Beck et al., 1979). Ground breaking in the field has been Aaron
Beck’s (1967) cognitive model of depression positing that vulnerability to depression can largely be
explained by a negative cognitive style, wherein schemas are an integral component. Specially,
9

schemas are understood as “enduring internal structures of stored generic or prototypical features of
stimuli, ideas, or experiences that are used to organize new information” (Clark, Beck, & Alford,
1999, p. 79). The schema concept is centralized in Beck’s theory, as schemas add an element of
organization to cognitions, representing an existing structure that all people have for filtering
incoming information. It is theorized that schemas originate in childhood, and become elaborated and
refined over the course of development (Beck, 1967).
Schemas can be studied along two related dimensions – content and structure. Here, selfschema content represents an individual’s actual beliefs (e.g., “I am incompetent”; Beck, 1967).
Persuasive evidence links various types of negative content to risk for depression (see Lakdawalla,
Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2007). By contrast, self-schema structure has been defined as the
“architecture” or manner in which beliefs are “stored and organized” (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal,
1998; p. 15). Specifically, it is theorized that schemas vary in terms of the interconnectedness of their
contents, such that ideas contained within schemas may be more or less related to one another
(Dozois & Beck, 2008). If self-schema elements are tightly organized, they would theoretically
become easily activated, since the activation of one component would spread to other components
(Segal, 1988). Accordingly, events that activate schemas would ostensibly provoke a larger
emotional response when elements are more closely rather than loosely interrelated (Bower, 1981).
Although negative content diminishes following recovery from a depressive episode, certain
structural aspects seem to persist (e.g., Dozois, 2007).
Examining Self-Schema Structure as a Vulnerability Factor for Mania
The vast majority of previous research in this area has examined self-schema content.
However, as previously mentioned, self-schemas can also be studied in terms of their structural
characteristics. Although traditional self-referent encoding and semantic priming tasks can provide
information about the underlying self-structure (e.g., Segal et al., 2006), the Psychological Distance
10

Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson, 2001b) has been designed explicitly for this purpose.
During this task, participants are presented with a number of adjectives (e.g., “Capable”, “Rejected”)
on a computer screen. They are asked to position each adjective within a four-quadrant grid based on
the adjective’s perceived self-descriptiveness (x-axis) and valence (y-axis). Over multiple iterations,
the computer calculates the interstimulus distance between positive and negative rated adjectives,
which theoretically provides an indication of self-schema interconnectedness or consolidation. The
task has typically been used to examine the structural characteristics of two distinct forms of selfschema content, namely, beliefs about oneself within interpersonal and achievement domains.
The importance of examining self-schema structure in addition to self-schema content has
been illustrated in cases of depression and other psychological disorders. Notably, Dozois and
colleagues have demonstrated that the severity of depressive symptoms corresponds with greater
interconnectedness of negative self-referent beliefs, along with reduced interconnectedness of
positive self-referent information (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Dozois & Frewen, 2006). In
addition, upon remission from a depressive episode, negative self-referent information appears to
remain densely interconnected (Dozois, 2007; Dozois & Dobson, 2001a). As such, it has been
proposed that this configuration is a vulnerability marker for depression, particularly for
interpersonal, self-schema content (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b). Furthermore, the organization of
positive and negative self-schema content within the interpersonal domain has been shown to interact
with negative life events to predict the course of depressive symptoms (Seeds & Dozois, 2010).
Available evidence on cognitive structure in mania derives from research on the ‘selfcompartmentalization model’ (Showers, 1992). This theory is concerned with how positive and
negative information about the self is assimilated. The ‘integrated self’ characterizes an ability to
incorporate differently valenced information into a single self-aspect, whereas the
‘compartmentalized self’ describes a segregation of information based on valence (either positive or
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negative). A handful of studies have indicated that individuals with a history of bipolar disorder or
unipolar depression exhibit a higher degree of self-compartmentalization compared to individuals
without a disorder (Alatiq et al., 2010; Power, de Jong, & Lloyd, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007). These
researchers postulate that this finding could help to explain mood swings in bipolar disorder, in that
an environmental event may activate beliefs about the self that are almost exclusively positive or
negative in nature. However, since similar features appear to characterize unipolar depression, it is
still unclear how these cognitive factors may uniquely predispose individuals towards mania.
Life Events and Mania
The findings just reviewed suggest that any consideration of a cognitive vulnerability-stress
framework needs to also consider the potential influence of life events on manic symptoms. Here,
numerous studies of bipolar disorder have documented the importance of negative life events.
Specifically, negative life events have been linked to future depressive symptoms, as well as longer
time to recovery from depressive episodes (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Miller, 1997). However,
these patterns do not appear to hold for manic symptoms (e.g., Johnson et al., 1999, 2008a). As a
result, the impact of different types of life events on mania has been investigated.
Goal Attainment and BAS-Activating Events. In line with a reward sensitivity model of
mania, studies of bipolar disorder have examined events associated with goal-striving and
achievement. Prospective research piloted by Johnson and colleagues (2000b, 2008b) has indicated
that life events that reflect attainment of important goals (e.g., admission into graduate school,
getting married) predict more severe manic, but not depressive, symptoms among individuals
diagnosed with BD-I when statistically controlling for baseline symptoms. Similarly, events that
involve striving towards important goals have also been implicated in the course of manic symptoms.
In particular, a prospective study of students indicated that 42% of individuals diagnosed with BD-II
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and cyclothymia developed a hypomanic episode following a goal-striving event (i.e., studying for
final exams; Nusslock et al., 2007).
More precisely, BAS-activating events have been described as situations in which there is a
clear reward or desired goal that one has an opportunity to pursue (e.g., starting a new job; meeting
an attractive stranger to attain a partner). It is posited that relevant events lead to ‘normal’ levels of
BAS activation in most people, but lead to over-activation of the BAS in persons vulnerable to
bipolar disorder, which may in turn trigger (hypo)mania (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Urošević et al.,
2008). Conversely, it is posited that BAS-deactivating events constitute a loss or failure (e.g., losing
a job; being rejected by a romantic interest). It is theorized that these events lead to extreme
deactivation of the BAS in individuals prone to bipolar disorder, which in turn triggers depression.
Data indicate that compared to healthy control participants, persons diagnosed with BD-II or
cyclothymia experience more BAS-activating and deactivating life events, in general (Bender et al.,
2010; Urošević et al., 2010).
The Interplay between Cognitive Content and Life Events
Thus far, only a small number of investigations have examined how certain forms of
cognitive content may interact with life events to influence the course of mania (Alloy et al., 1999;
Alloy et al., 2006). One study of individuals with a history of hypomania found that negative
cognitive content did not predict manic symptoms within the context of life events (Alloy et al.,
1999). Importantly, however, this study also found that a positive attributional style interacted with
positive events to predict later fluctuations in manic symptoms (Alloy et al., 1999). A similar study
reported that self-critical and perfectionistic attitudes interacted with negative and positive events to
predict future increases in depressive and manic symptoms, respectively (Alloy et al., 2006).
The above results provide preliminary evidence that cognitive constructs interact with certain
life events (i.e., positive) to predict the course of manic symptoms. Thus, this line of research is
13

promising regarding the potential viability of a cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania.
Notably, no known investigations of mania have provided a more detailed examination of
interactions between life events and self-schema constructs, by considering the role of self-schema
structure, in addition to content, within these interactions.
Mood Induction Procedures
Given the hypothesized role of life events within a cognitive vulnerability-stress framework,
an important consideration is how Mood Induction Procedures (MIPs) may affect the general study
of self-schema characteristics. Since it is theorized that maladaptive schemas remain dormant until
activated by life stress, certain features would theoretically be imperceptible under ordinary
circumstances. Therefore, one approach to accessing these beliefs in potentially vulnerable persons is
to apply MIPs to mimic the effects of stressors and ostensibly activate an individual’s cognitive
network (e.g., Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000). Although mood priming may not be necessary to
examine all aspects of the self-schema (e.g., schema structure; Dozois & Dobson, 2001a), research
indicates that certain features cannot be identified without the use of priming, at least in cases of
depression (e.g., Ingram et al., 1994).
No known investigations have directly assessed whether MIPs sensitize the examination of
self-schema characteristics among individuals with a history of, or risk, for mania. Exploring this
question would support the understanding of cognitive vulnerability mechanisms in bipolar disorder.
Furthermore, determining whether MIPs are necessary for the study of self-schema constructs would
help to inform future research in this area.
The Present Dissertation
To summarize, previous research has examined cognitive vulnerability factors in relation to
mania, primarily considering aspects of self-schema content. Despite some mood congruent findings,
existing evidence indicates that the manic self-schema is largely characterized by negative content.
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Dysfunctional beliefs surrounding goal-striving and achievement may distinguish bipolar disorder
from related conditions, in line with a reward sensitivity model. Also congruent with this model,
existing evidence links goal attainment and BAS-activating events to the onset of manic symptoms.
Overall, a major gap in the current literature is research that teases apart the specific cognitive
characteristics that are linked to mania, rather than related phenomena such as comorbid depressive
symptoms and cases of unipolar depression. In particular, the current state of the research highlights
more similarities than differences in cognitive vulnerability factors that characterize mania versus
depression, particularly with reference to previously stated findings concerning negative cognitive
style. In addition, much of this literature has relied on the reward sensitivity model to inform a
cognitive vulnerability theory of mania. However, relying on a higher-level explanation does not
necessarily clarify how self-schemas may dynamically operate in conjunction with other factors to
predispose individuals toward mania.
Together, the above considerations further suggest that examining self-schema content alone
may be insufficient for explicating the cognitive mechanisms involved in conferring vulnerability
towards mania. In this regard, few available studies can speak to self-schema organization in relation
to mania, with no known investigations utilizing the PDST to examine the interconnectedness of
positive and negative beliefs within the self-schema. Further, when applying a cognitive
vulnerability-stress framework, it has yet to be considered how both self-schema content and
structure may interact with life events to potentially influence manic symptomatology. In addition,
using measures of mania risk to index mania, rather than remitted diagnostic status, is a widespread
approach to in the field. Yet, very few studies have employed this method to study cognitive
vulnerability mechanisms. Finally, no known studies have utilized mood priming to sensitively
examine self-schema components (content and structure) within the context of mania.
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In summary, the current dissertation aims to integrate and advance previous research findings
by examining both self-schema content and structure, and the conditions under which these selfschema components are activated (i.e., their interaction with life events and mood induction
procedures). This research was conducted within non-clinical samples, using the hypomanic
personality as an indicator of risk for developing future manic episodes. Overall, these research
objectives serve to inform a more comprehensive, cognitive vulnerability-stress theory of mania that
includes consideration of both self-schema components and life events. Furthering our
understanding of mania in this manner is important, as it may ultimately help to improve the
application of mental health interventions in cases of bipolar disorder.
Primary Objectives
The three main studies of this dissertation address the following broad research questions.
Briefly, Study 1 serves as a cross-sectional examination, in which basic relations between selfschema components and mania are explored within a large, online community sample. Study 2
provides a longitudinal investigation, in which a range of potential effects among self-schema
components, life events, and mood symptoms are examined within an online community sample.
Finally, Study 3 serves as a cross-sectional replication of major findings within a different, nonclinical sample (i.e., a university student sample).
Subsumed under each of the following research questions are more specific sub-questions and
hypotheses addressing a number of relevant issues, which will be discussed in greater detail within
the chapters that address objectives for each of the three studies.
(i) Research Question 1. Are there aspects of self-schema content and structure that characterize
high mania risk?
A central goal of this dissertation is to simply examine the self-schema constructs of content and
structure that may be associated with heightened risk for mania, since limited evidence is thus far
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available, particularly for self-schema structure. The initial cross-sectional study of this dissertation
focuses on this research objective. Broadly, it was hypothesized in Study 1 that heightened mania
risk would correspond with maladaptive self-schema content associated with goal-striving and
achievement, in light of existing research on the reward sensitivity model (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012).
Regarding self-schema structure, it was hypothesized that mania risk would be associated with highly
interconnected positive, as well as negative, self-schema content. Such a pattern would help to
explain the mood swings observed in bipolar disorder, and is consistent with preliminary findings on
the self-concept in mania (Taylor et al., 2007).
(ii) Research Question 2. How do mood induction procedures (MIPs) influence the examination of
self-schema content among those at different levels of mania risk?
Study 1 also includes a test of a positive MIP. The aim is to elucidate whether MIPs increase the
sensitivity with which self-schema constructs can be identified in relation to mania, which is an
important consideration for research conducted in this area.
(iii) Research Question 3. Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood
symptoms?
The cross-sectional component in Study 1 also examines the degree to which self-schema
characteristics (content and structure) may play a role in maladaptive and adaptive pathways leading
towards mood symptoms. Moreover, a longitudinal component of this research (Study 2) permits a
more rigorous examination of self-schema characteristics as potential predictors of the course of mood
symptoms.
(iv) Research Question 4. Do self-schema components interact with congruent life events to predict
the course of mood symptoms among those at high risk for mania?
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Both Studies 2 and 3 investigate whether self-schema components interact with life events, as
well as mania risk, to predict mood symptomatology. The longitudinal component in Study 2 permits
examination of these patterns across time.
(v)

Research Question 5. Can major findings regarding self-schema components and their relation
to mania show replication?
Study 2 also examines whether cross-sectional findings from Study 1 can be replicated within

the same sample type (i.e., an online, community sample), in a separate instance. In addition, Study 3
serves as a replication within an entirely different nonclinical sample (i.e., an online, university
student sample), in order to clarify whether major findings can be generalized beyond one group of
individuals.
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Chapter 2
Study 1: An Initial Cross-Sectional Examination
The cross-sectional approach used in Study l primarily addresses the first and second research
questions of this dissertation, but additionally informs the third research question. As such, Study 1
examines self-schema content and structure in relation to mania risk, as well as how these selfschema constructs may bear on manic symptomatology. In addition, this study assesses the impact of
mood induction procedures (MIPs) on the activation of mania-related aspects of self-schema content
and structure.
Research Question 1: Are there aspects of self-schema content and structure that characterize
high mania risk?
Self-Schema Content. As described earlier, some limited prior research has implicated
maladaptive beliefs and dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving and achievement among
individuals with a history of mania (e.g., Chen & Johnson, 2012; Dodd et al., 2011a, 2011b; Lam et
al., 2004; Lee et al., 2010). These findings, which are consistent with a reward sensitivity model (see
Johnson et al., 2012), have been promising in terms of isolating self-schema content that
differentiates between mania and other forms of psychopathology, such as unipolar depression. The
present study builds on this prior research by examining self-schema content in a non-clinical
sample, using the hypomanic personality as an indicator of mania risk. This involves studying a set
of dysfunctional attitudes pertaining to goal attainment, which have been previously documented
among individuals with a history of bipolar disorder and appear less relevant to depression (Lam et
al., 2004). These attitudes include beliefs about success being central to self-worth and the
importance of consistently feeling positive.
Study 1 further extends past research by examining constructs that appear to relate to goalstriving and achievement, but have yet to be studied in relation to mania. This includes examining the
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presence of cognitive distortions (e.g., mind-reading, catastrophizing), which refer to errors in
information processing that result in a negatively-biased view of a situation (Beck, Rush, Shaw, &
Emery, 1979). In further elaboration of this line of research, the present study explores whether
cognitive distortions are more apparent in achievement situations among those at high mania risk.
In addition, several past studies have linked bipolar disorder with high levels of perfectionism
(e.g., Lam et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2000). In particular, research conducted by Hewitt and colleagues
(e.g., Hewitt & Flett, 1990; Hewitt et al., 1991) has supported three main dimensions of
perfectionism. These are as follows: perfectionistic behaviour that is directed towards oneself (i.e.,
Self-Oriented), perfectionism directed towards others (i.e., Other-Oriented), and perfectionism
attributed to external sources (i.e., Socially-Prescribed). Limited prior research has considered mania
in relation to these different dimensions of perfectionism. Two studies of mixed clinical samples
have suggested that chronic manic symptoms are associated with high levels of socially-prescribed
perfectionism, in particular (Hewitt et al., 1998; Corry et al., 2017). The present study builds on this
work by examining associations between mania risk and these dimensions of perfectionism.
A further individual difference characteristic that may be relevant to manic self-schemas is
obsessive passion (Vallerand et al., 2003). Obsessive passion describes an internal pressure to
perform an activity due to strong internalization of the activity into one’s identity, often resulting in
other areas of life being adversely affected (Vallerand et al., 2003). As such, the construct of
obsessive passion may also be relevant to the goal-striving aspects of mania. Consistent with this
proposal, past research has shown significant associations between obsessive passion and negative
indicators of well-being (e.g., high levels of negative affect; Vallerand et al., 2003).
In contrast, harmonious passion is described by Vallerand et al (2003) as being achieved
when one can freely choose to engage in the activity, and it occupies a large but not disproportionate
space in one’s identity, allowing the activity to exist in harmony with other aspects of life. Taken
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together, these characteristics suggest minimal impact of harmonious passion on mania risk and
related symptoms. However, there is the potential for harmonious passion to serve as a protective
factor, particularly when considering a reward sensitivity model of mania. Existing research on
harmonious passion and its association with well-being indicators (e.g., positive affect; Vallerand et
al., 2003) again supports this hypothesis.
Finally, self-referent beliefs about achievement that are adaptive in nature are also explored in
Study 1 (e.g., “ I expect strengths and weaknesses, ups and downs, but overall I am positive about
myself”; Hillson, 1997). These beliefs derive from research on positive personality dimensions, and
are thought to serve a protective function given their association with positive well-being indicators
within non-clinical samples (Hillson, 1997). Study 1 provides an initial examination of whether these
beliefs may serve a similar function among individuals at heightened risk for mania.
Self-Schema Content Hypotheses. It was hypothesized that the constructs addressing selfschema content would share significant, positive relations with mania risk. Specifically, it was
predicted that high endorsement of maladaptive beliefs related to achievement (i.e., dysfunctional
attitudes about goal attainment and cognitive distortions within achievement situations) would
correspond with high levels of the hypomanic personality. It was also hypothesized that mania risk
would be positively associated with aspects of perfectionism and obsessive passion. Finally, it was
tentatively predicted that harmonious passion and adaptive self-referent beliefs about success would
serve a protective function within the context of mania risk. This may or may not be reflected in
direct associations between mania risk and these constructs. For example, these adaptive
characteristics may instead moderate between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms. This
issue was explored under the second research question of the dissertation (see further below).
Self-Schema Structure. As previously described, this dissertation also examines self-schema
structure, in order to consider how the organization of self-beliefs may be associated with mania risk.
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Recall that a well-validated measure of self-schema structure, the PDST (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b),
considers how positive and negative information about the self is organized, and also permits a more
sensitive examination of content within specific domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal).
Self-Schema Structure Hypotheses. A central hypothesis of this dissertation was that high
risk for mania would have clear associations with aspects of self-schema structure, and that these
findings would be distinct from structural aspects that characterize depression. As previously
mentioned, depression is characterized by densely interconnected, negative self-schema content and
loosely connected, positive self-schema content – especially for content within the interpersonal
domain (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). The present hypothesis was that, similar
to depression, individuals at high risk for mania would exhibit tightly interconnected negative
content. This prediction was informed by previous research indicating the presence of negative selfschema content within the context of bipolar disorder (e.g., Adams et al., 2014). Furthermore, in light
of prior findings implicating dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving/achievement, a subhypothesis was that negative content in the achievement domain, in particular, would exhibit dense
connectivity among participants at high risk for mania.
Importantly, it was further predicted that aspects of positive self-schema content would be
tightly organized. This hypothesis is informed by the phenomenology of mania, in which grandiosity
and inflated self-esteem are hallmark symptoms (APA, 2013). However, contrary to Leahy and
Beck’s (1988) original hypothesis, manic symptomatology cannot simply be explained by positive
self-referent beliefs and cognitive biases, since previous research suggests that individuals with
bipolar disorder display relatively little positive self-referent information (e.g., Adams et al., 2014;
Pyle & Mansell, 2010). Thus, a plausible alternative explanation advanced in the present study is that
mania involves the activation of a relatively small, but densely organized, subset of positive beliefs.
Once activated, these beliefs would ostensibly provoke a large, momentary, positive response in
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individuals, consistent with the phenomenology of manic episodes. A specific sub-hypothesis was
that those at high risk for mania would display dense connectivity of positive self-schema content
within the achievement domain, in particular.
Research Question 2. How do mood induction procedures (MIPs) influence the examination of
self-schema content among those at different levels of mania risk?
As mentioned in the General Introduction, few known investigations on mania have utilized
mood priming to examine self-schema components. However, such priming may be necessary to
reveal important characteristics. Given existing research on bipolar disorder that implicates reward
sensitivity as a vulnerability factor (see Johnson et al., 2012), it was predicted that positive mood
priming that has a goal-striving theme would aid in the examination of self-schema content.
Specifically, it was theorized that this MIP would activate a subset of self-referent beliefs associated
with goal-striving and achievement, which may be particularly relevant to mania in light of the
reward sensitivity model. This hypothesis was also informed by previous research indicating that
positive mood states appear to be associated with certain changes in cognition (e.g., positive selffocused rumination) among those with a history of or risk for mania (Feldman et al., 2008; Gruber et
al., 2008b; Raes et al., 2010). Notably, in the current study, effects of the MIP were only explored for
self-schema content and not structure, since schema organization is theoretically a more stable
characteristic and existing evidence indicates that mood priming may not be necessary for examining
self-schema structure (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a).
Research Question 3. Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood
symptoms?
The cross-sectional design of Study 1 also begins to address the third research question, by
considering how self-schema components may function within pathways towards manic symptoms.
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As described in more detail below, it was predicted that certain self-schema constructs would serve
as mediators between mania risk and the occurrence of mood symptoms.
Maladaptive Pathways. It was predicted that self-schema components would help to explain
the nature of potential relations between the hypomanic personality and mood symptoms. That is, it
was theorized that self-schema constructs may function as a pathway through which mania risk leads
to mood symptoms. As such, it was examined whether maladaptive self-schema content (i.e.,
dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment, obsessive passion, perfectionism) mediate the relation
between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms. Similarly, aspects of self-schema structure
that were hypothesized to be particularly relevant for mania (i.e., highly interconnected, positive selfschema content) were expected to be significant mediators in paths to manic symptoms. Finally, a
sub-hypothesis was that negative self-schema structure and certain forms of self-schema content
highly implicated in depression (e.g., cognitive distortions in the achievement domain) would also
serve as a mediator, but between the hypomanic personality and depressive symptoms.
Adaptive Self-Schema Components. As previously alluded to, Study 1 further expands on
the current research literature by considering adaptive self-schema constructs related to achievement
and goal-striving (i.e., harmonious passion and adaptive self-referent beliefs about success). Here, it
was tentatively hypothesized that these constructs may have a protective function within the context
of mania. Since it was not anticipated that every individual with high mania risk may exhibit
hypothesized protective factors, these self-schema constructs were best conceptualized as moderators
rather than mediators. Specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals displaying high risk for
mania may show little manic symptomatology at high levels of these protective factors.
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Study 1 – Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program. This is
an open access, online program that is utilized by over 100,000 people from more than 100 countries
to complete paid computer tasks (Pontin, 2007). Existing evidence supports the use of this program
for conducting psychological research, indicating that the quality of results obtained is comparable to
traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). The integrity of
findings is supported particularly when MTurk users have a strong history of receiving approval for
MTurk tasks (i.e., a high task-approval rating).
Only individuals from primarily English-speaking countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom and United States) were permitted to complete the study. In addition, only
individuals with an MTurk approval rating of 95% were able to sign-up for the task, indicating that at
least 95% of their previously completed MTurk tasks had been approved. Seven careful responding
questions were also incorporated into the study questionnaire to assess the attentiveness of
participants (e.g., I eat breakfast everyday at 4pm [True/False]; For this item, please select ‘Slightly
Disagree’). The compensation rate for the current study was set at $1.50 on the MTurk website.
A total of 482 adults enrolled in the study; however, 23 participants were excluded from
analyses due to incorrectly answering two or more careful responding questions. Notably, almost all
of these excluded participants also appeared to discontinue their participation partway through the
study. Thus, the final sample comprised of 459 participants (244 females, 215 males). Nine percent
of participants were aged 18 to 24 years, 46% were 25 to 34 years, 26% were 35 to 44 years, 12%
were 45 to 54 years, 7% were 55 to 64 years, and 2% were 65 to 74 years. Regarding ethnicity, 76%
of participants identified as White, 9% as Black or African-American, 7% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian,
and 2% as another ethnicity. The vast majority of participants reported living in the United States
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(99%), whereas less than 1% of individuals were living in Canada (0.6%) or Australia (0.4%). Sixtyone percent of individuals reported an education level of post-secondary degree completion or
higher. Regarding mental health history, 19% of participants reported a past diagnosis of mental
disorder, with 7% endorsing more than one diagnosis and 15% reporting a current diagnosis.
Commonly listed diagnoses included depression (10% of the total sample) and anxiety disorders
(6%). In addition, a history of bipolar-related disorder was reported by 2.4% of participants.
Materials
The materials utilized in this study are described below. A summary of these measures is also
provided in Table 1.1.
Risk for Mania. Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). As
previously mentioned, the HPS is a self-report measure that has been used extensively to index risk
for the future development of manic and hypomanic episodes. Specifically, this scale examines
features of the hypomanic personality style, whereby individuals are “characterized as upbeat,
gregarious, confident and energetic people who sometimes display these attributes to a maladaptive
extreme, becoming euphoric, hypersociable, grandiose, and overactive” (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986,
p. 216). As such, this construct reflects a temperamental risk factor for mania. The HPS is comprised
of 48 true-false items (e.g., I often have moods where I feel so energetic and optimistic that I feel I
could outperform almost anyone at anything; When I feel an emotion, I usually feel it with extreme
intensity). High scores on this measure correspond with high psychological vulnerability towards
mania. In this dissertation, mania risk is treated as a continuous variable, which has been one major
approach in the literature (e.g., Johnson & Carver, 2006).
A large literature supports the reliability and validity of the HPS. Specifically, the HPS has
demonstrated good internal consistency (e.g., Stanton, McArtor, & Watson, 2019) and convergent
validity. In particular, numerous studies have demonstrated that HPS scores strongly predict
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Table 1.1
Summary Table of Measures for Study 1
Category

Scale

Risk for Mania

Hypomanic Personality Scale

Brief Description of
Measure
A commonly used and well-validated measure
of mania risk. It assesses the extent to which
individuals display temperamental
characteristics associated with the future
development of manic symptoms.

Mood
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale Examines self-perceived manic symptoms (i.e.,
Symptomatology
heightened euphoria, activity, confidence,
talkativeness and decreased need for sleep)
over the previous week.
DASS-21 – Depression subscale

Assesses the degree to which participants have
experienced depressive symptoms over the
previous week.

Self-Schema
Structure

Psychological Distance Scaling
Task

Examines the organization or consolidation of
positive and negative self-beliefs within
interpersonal and achievement domains.

Self-Schema
Content

Belief Statements Questionnaire – This subscale assesses the extent to which
Fulfillment subscale
individuals display adaptive self-referent
beliefs related to achievement.
Cognitive Distortions Scale

Examines the extent to which participants
notice the presence of several cognitive
distortions within achievement and
interpersonal situations.

DAS – Goal Attainment Subscale Assesses the degree to which participants
display dysfunctional attitudes related to goal
attainment, which have been linked to mania.
Multidimensional Perfectionism
Scale

Three subscales examine participants’
agreement with four perfectionistic tendencies,
which relate to a strong desire for perfection
that is directed towards oneself (SelfOriented), others (Other-Oriented), or is
attributed to others despite one’s self-focus
(Socially Prescribed).

Passion Scale

Considers whether individuals display a
passion for an activity and whether this is
adaptive (Harmonious Passion) or maladaptive
(Obsessive Passion).
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concurrent and future manic symptoms and episodes (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2000; Walsh et al., 2015).
The HPS also correlates highly with bipolar-relevant measures that have demonstrated adequate
sensitivity and specificity, including the Mood Disorder Questionnaire (Hirschfeld et al., 2000).
Recent research has also examined the factor structure underlying the HPS, indicating the
presence of five distinct factors/ subscales: (1) Activation, (2) Charisma, (3) Intellectual Confidence,
(4) Lability, and (5) Modesty. The Activation subscale, in particular, appears to support the divergent
validity of the HPS and its specificity to mania. This scale corresponds with high levels of activation,
energy, and recklessness. Importantly, this subscale displays strong associations with bipolarrelevant measures, similar to total HPS scores (Stanton et al., 2019). However, compared to the full
scale and other subscales, the Activation subscale shows weaker associations with other forms of
psychopathology and personality aspects (e.g., substance abuse, borderline personality disorder,
psychopathy, narcissism; Stanton et al., 2019). As such, this subscale of the HPS was used as the
major indicator of mania risk in the current dissertation.
Current Mood Symptoms. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman et al., 1997). The
ASRM is a five-item scale that assesses manic symptomatology over the previous week. This scale
prompts individuals to consider their levels of euphoria, self-confidence, need for sleep,
talkativeness, and activity, and specifically, their degree of change compared to typical levels.
Example response items from this scale are: I do not feel happier or more cheerful than usual; I have
frequently been more active than usual.
This scale has been used extensively in the literature and has shown good test-retest reliability
(Altman et al., 1997). The ASRM has also demonstrated good convergent validity, in that it has
correlated strongly with other bipolar-relevant measures (Altman et al., 1997), including diagnostic
interviews such as the Clinician-Administered Rating Scale for Mania (Altman et al., 1994) and
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Young Mania Rating Scale (Young et al. 1978). In addition, this scale has distinguished individuals
with mania from those with schizophrenia and unipolar depression (Altman et al., 1997).
Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 is a widely used self-report instrument that assesses depressive,
anxious, and stressful symptomology. Only the Depression subscale was administered in the current
study to yield a continuous measure of depressive symptoms. This subscale is comprised of 7
statements (e.g., I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all; I felt that I had nothing to
look forward to), which participants are asked to rate using a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (i.e., did
not apply to me at all) to 3 (i.e., applied to me very much, or most of the time). The Depression
subscale of the DASS-21 has shown excellent internal consistency (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, &
Swinson, 1998). This was also demonstrated in the current study (Cronbach’s alpha = .94 for this
measure). In addition, the Depression subscale correlates highly with related measures, such as the
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), supporting the concurrent validity
of this measure.
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson,
2001b). The PDST is a computer-based task in which participants are presented with a number of
adjectives on a screen (e.g., desirable, inadequate). They are asked to position each adjective within
a four-quadrant grid based on their perceived self-descriptiveness (x-axis) and valence (y-axis). The
left endpoint of the x-axis is labelled “not at all like me” and the right endpoint is labelled “very
much like me”. In a similar manner, the top endpoint of the y-axis is labelled “very positive” whereas
the bottom endpoint is labelled “very negative”.
The set of adjectives employed in the current study can be found in Appendix A. These
adjectives were taken from previous research using this task (e.g., Dozois, 2007; Seeds & Dozois,
2010), and have been matched on important variables such as word length, word frequency,
29

familiarity, and emotional intensity. These adjectives represent two different types of self-schema
content, namely, positive and negative beliefs within the interpersonal and achievement domains. As
such, 20 adjectives correspond with each of the following content domains: interpersonal positive
(e.g., admired, kind), interpersonal negative (e.g., unloved, annoying), achievement positive (e.g.,
capable, successful), and achievement negative (e.g., failure, helpless). These content domains have
been associated with excellent interrater reliability (94% agreement; κ = .87; Dozois, 2007; Dozois &
Frewen, 2006).
At the beginning of the task, participants are presented with one adjective that appears at the
center of the grid. After the participant has positioned this adjective using the computer mouse, they
can press the “Enter” key or click a “Submit” button located below the grid. Consequently, the
adjective disappears, and then another adjective is presented, until a total of 60 adjectives have been
placed. Over multiple iterations, the computer calculates the interstimulus distance between
adjectives within a given content domain (e.g., achievement positive).
To calculate and interpret PDST results in the present dissertation, a similar approach was taken
to previous studies (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). Specifically, interstimulus
distance scores were calculated for six different content domains of the PDST: (i) Overall Positive, (ii)
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Overall Negative,
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Achievement,
(iv) Negative
Achievement,
(v) Positive Interpersonal,

To compute the average interstimulus distance among the positive and negative

and (vi) Negative
Interpersonal. To calculate interstimulus distance, the following idiographic formula
adjectives, the computer calculated a coordinate point (x- and y-axis) for each
adjective. Interstimulus distances for self-referent positive and self-referent negative

was used: content were computed using the following idiographic formula:
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where X is the adjective placement on the self-descriptiveness axis, Y is the adjective

Here,
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withaxis,
the and
placement
of adjectives
the self-descriptiveness
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on the valence
n is the total
number ofalong
self-descriptive
adjectives.
Therefore, the average interstimulus distances for a particular content of self-referent
adjectives
equals the
square
root ofaxis,
the and
mean
of every
the placement
of adjectives
along
the valence
n issquared
the sumdistances
of all possible
distances for a
adjective–adjective combination, divided by the total number of possible distances
for that content area (see Dozois & Dobson, 2001b for additional information
given domain.
Thus, this formula computes the mean-squared distances of each adjective-adjective
concerning the development of this measure).
Interstimulus distance scores were calculated for six areas of self-referent
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information: overall positive, overall negative, interpersonal
positive, interpersonal
negative, achievement positive, and achievement negative adjectives. Scores for the
present study were logarithmically transformed to compensate for violations in the
normality of the distribution. Hence, all scores reported and used in subsequent
analyses are log scores. The fundamental assumption of this task is that smaller

combination within each content domain. This value is divided by the number of possible distances
and the square root is taken. In the current study, these scores were then logarithmically transformed
to address violations regarding the normal distribution of scores, consistent with previous research.
The resulting value theoretically provides an indication of interconnectedness or consolidation, with
the primary assumption being that less interstimulus distance between adjectives corresponds with
greater interconnectedness, and vice versa. For more detailed information regarding this task, see
Dozois & Dobson, 2001b.
Extant evidence supports the psychometric properties of the PDST (e.g., Dozois, 2002;
Dozois & Dobson, 2001b, 2003; Dozois & Frewen, 2006). Among stably depressed individuals, the
6-month test-retest reliability coefficients are .70 and .51 for negative and positive interpersonal
content, respectively (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a). The construct validity of this measure is informed
by research demonstrating that negative self-schema content is highly consolidated among anxious
and depressed samples, whereas diffuse, positive self-schema content appears to be characteristic of
depression, in particular (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b). This task has also shown that the consolidation
of negative, interpersonal content varies as a function of individual levels of dysphoria and number
of previous depressive episodes (Dozois, 2002; Dozois & Dobson, 2003). Further investigations have
demonstrated that the tight organization of negative self-schema content within the interpersonal
domain is discernible outside of mood episodes in cases of depression (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a).
Self-Schema Content. Belief Statements Questionnaire – Fulfillment subscale (Hillson,
1997). The Beliefs Statements Questionnaire was designed to assess adaptive beliefs within the
context of interpersonal and achievement-related situations. Only the Fulfillment subscale of this
measure that probes participants about achievement situations was utilized in the current study. This
subscale contextualizes adaptive beliefs (e.g., It is important to like and feel proud of oneself and
one’s accomplishments), such that they become self-referential and reflect perceived embodiment of
31

those beliefs (e.g., I like and feel proud of myself and my accomplishments). Participants were
presented with seven of these statements, which they were asked to rate using a 7-point scale,
ranging from 1(Very untrue) to 7 (Very true). The Accuracy subscale has good internal consistency
(α = .85), as well as concurrent validity regarding psychological well-being (Hillson, 1997).
Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS; Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011). The CDS is a
self-report instrument that examines participants’ identification with ten cognitive distortions,
namely, (1) Mindreading, (2) Catastrophizing, (3) All-or-Nothing Thinking, (4) Emotional
Reasoning, (5) Labeling, (6) Mental Filter, (7) Overgeneralization, (8) Personalization, (9) Should
Statements, and (10) Minimizing or Disqualifying the Positive. The CDS is comprised of 10 items
that present a brief description of each cognitive distortion and two vignettes that exemplify how the
distortion may manifest in daily life. For example, the item for Emotional Reasoning describes how
“People can believe something to be true because it “feels” that way.” One of the accompanying
vignettes illustrates how a man has received positive performance evaluations at work, and yet he
feels like a failure and thus begins to believe he is a failure. For each cognitive distortion,
participants are then asked to indicate the perceived frequency with which they experience that
cognitive distortion within social (e.g., family, romantic relationships) and achievement-related
situations (e.g., work, school), using a 7-point scale that ranges from 1(Never) to 7(All The Time).
The CDS has shown excellent reliability (α = .85) and concurrent validity in terms of its association
with measures of stress, anxiety, and depression (Covin et al., 2011).
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment subscale (DAS-GA; Lam et al., 2004). This
subscale of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Power et al., 1994) is designed to be specific to
mania-relevant cognitions, as indicated by previous factor analytic research (Lam et al., 2004). It is
comprised of six items that describe dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving and achievement,
as well as the importance of consistently feeling positive (e.g., A person should do well at everything
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he/she undertakes; I should be happy all the time). Participants are presented with these statements
and indicate their agreement using a 7-point scale, from Totally Agree to Totally Disagree. This
subscale has been associated with adequate internal consistency (α = .79), as well as good convergent
and discriminant validity. In particular, this subscale has positively correlated with past
hospitalizations due to manic episodes, and it has distinguished between patients with bipolar
disorder and unipolar depression (Lam et al., 2004).
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1990). The MPS is a 45-item,
self-report inventory that examines three dimensions of perfectionism: (1) Self-oriented, (2) Otheroriented, and (3) Socially prescribed perfectionism. Self-oriented perfectionism refers to
perfectionistic behaviour directed towards oneself (e.g., I strive to be as perfect as I can be; When I
am working on something, I cannot relax until it is perfect), whereas other-oriented perfectionism
focuses on the expectations of others (e.g., I have high expectations for the people that are important
to me; I can’t be bothered with people who won’t strive to better themselves). Socially prescribed
perfectionism involves attributing one’s perfectionistic behaviours to others (e.g., People expect
nothing less than perfection from me; I find it difficult to meet others’ expectations of me).
Participants rate their agreement with items using a 7-point scale, from 1(Strongly Disagree) to 7
(Strongly Agree). The MPS has demonstrated good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas
ranging from .82 to .87 for the self-oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed subscales
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Similarly, the validity of the MPS is supported by research indicating that
these subscales converge with other measures of perfectionism, while also showing differential
relationships with psychopathology and personality constructs in the expected manner. As one
illustration, other-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism, in particular, have shown positive
relationships with several personality disorders, highlighting the interpersonal dimension shared by
these constructs (Hewitt & Flett, 1991).
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Passion Scale (Vallerand et al., 2003). The Passion Scale is comprised of 17 items that
participants rate using a 7-point scale, from 1(Not Agree at All) to 7(Very Strongly Agree). At the
beginning of the questionnaire, participants are asked to bring to mind their favourite activity. In the
current study, activities listed by participants included writing, dancing, and playing guitar.
Participants are then presented with the items that address three basic components: (1) the criteria for
passion, (2) obsessive passion, and (3) harmonious passion. Regarding the first component, five
items assess the extent to which participants are passionate about their activity by examining its
frequency, enjoyment and personal importance (e.g., This activity is part of who I am; I spend a lot of
time doing this activity). Secondly, six items examine whether individuals display ‘obsessive
passion’ for the activity. Recall that this concept relates to having little control over an activity, and
thus one’s identity and other life activities become unduly affected (e.g., I have the impression that
my activity controls me; If I could, I would only do my activity). Conversely, six items assess the
extent to which individuals display harmonious passion with their activity (e.g., This activity is in
harmony with the other activities in my life; My activity is well integrated in my life). Previous
research indicates that the Passion Scale has good psychometric properties (α = .73 and .85 for
harmonious and obsessive passion, respectively). In addition, these constructs have shown expected
relations with well-being indicators. For example, a study of football players found that harmonious
passion was associated with higher levels of positive affect over the course of a season, whereas
obsessive passion was associated with higher levels of negative affect (Vallerand et al., 2003).
Mood Induction Procedures (MIPs). Individuals were asked to participate in a directed
imagination task designed to evoke either a positive or neutral mood. The positive MIP has been
used in previous studies of mania and instructed participants to imagine that they had attained a
personally important goal (Tharp, Johnson, Sinclair, & Kumar, 2016). This exercise was adapted for
the present study to also create a neutral MIP, which was not anticipated to evoke a strong emotional
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reaction. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine a routine shopping trip, which has been
used successfully in previous research as an emotionally neutral condition (Luten, 1995). This task
was designed to be similar on important features, such as length of task and personal relevance.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the positive or neutral MIP. Instructions for
these tasks can be found in Appendix B. Specifically, audio instructions and visual prompts guided
participants through the imaginary scenario. First, participants were given an overview of the task
and the specific scenario they were asked to imagine. Next, they were prompted to type answers to a
number of questions that would help them to imagine their situation in detail (e.g., What about your
goal makes it important to you?; What would you think and feel if you achieved it?). They were then
instructed to clear their mind for 30 seconds, before imagining their scenario for two minutes.
Manipulation check. Follow-up questions were included in an effort to assess the
effectiveness of the MIPs (see Appendix B). In particular, immediately following the imagination
task, participants were asked to rate their emotional state using an 8-point Likert scale (-4 =
Extremely negative, 0 = Neutral, 4 = Extremely Positive). For participants in the present study, the
results of an independent t-test indicated their emotional state was significantly more positive
following the positive versus neutral MIP, t(441) = 12.57, p <.001. In particular, the mean rating for
emotional state was 3.04 (SD = 1.20) for the positive MIP and 0.94 (SD = 2.11) for the neutral MIP.
Procedure
Ethics approval was granted prior to data collection (see Appendix C for further details).
Mechanical Turk users who met the inclusion criteria for the study were able to view the
advertisement and proceed to the website hosting the study materials. After reading the Letter of
Information and consenting to participate, individuals viewed an introductory video in which the
experimenter introduced herself and provided a brief description of the study activities. Participants
were then instructed to complete the HPS, before being presented with the ASRM, DASS-21, and
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PDST in a randomized order. Following this, participants were randomly directed to either the
Positive, Negative or Neutral MIP. Finally, they were asked to complete the PBS, CDS, DAS,
Passion Scale, and MPS, in that order. Since it could not be precisely known how long the MIP
effects would last, it was decided not to randomize this final set of questionnaires. Finally,
participants were directed to the debriefing page, which contained information about the study, as
well as the numeric MTurk input code needed by the participant in order to receive compensation.
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Study 1 – Results and Discussion
The means, standard deviations, ranges, and reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for the mania,
mood symptomatology, and self-schema measures can be found in Table 1.2. These values are
consistent with those reported in previous research. In addition, the reliability coefficients for all
measures were quite acceptable, ranging from .81 to .94. Simple correlations between the mania and
mood symptomatology measures can be found in Appendix D. Consistent with previous research,
significant positive relationships were found between mania risk and manic symptoms. Mania risk
was also modestly associated with recent depressive symptoms.
The correlation matrix for the self-schema content and structure domains can also be found in
Appendix D. Consistent with expectations, many of these self-schema aspects intercorrelated with
one another. For example, in terms of content, small to large relationships were shown amongst the
perfectionism styles, obsessive passion, and dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment. In terms
of structure, positive content within different domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal) strongly
correlated, and vice versa.
Associations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Constructs
Recall that Research Questions 1 and 2 of this dissertation consider the relationships between
mania risk and self-schema constructs. To begin exploring these primary research questions,
bivariate correlations were calculated. These results are summarized in Table 1.3a and 1.3b, for selfschema content and structure, respectively. Table 1.3a shows that risk for mania (i.e., HPS scores)
positively correlated with the vast majority of measures reflecting maladaptive schema content.
Specifically, mania risk shared moderately strong relationships with interpersonal cognitive
distortions, obsessive passion, and socially-prescribed perfectionism. Additionally, the HPS was
modestly associated with the other forms of perfectionism, dysfunctional attitudes about goal
attainment, and achievement cognitive distortions.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics for the Mania, Mood Symptomatology, and Self-Schema Measures
Category

Measure

M

SD

Range

Reliability

Mania

HPS Activation

2.05

2.53

0-9

.86

Mood

ASRM

4.27

4.52

0-20

.85

Symptomatology
Self-Schema Content

DASS-21

4.93

5.46

0-21

.94

DAS

26.89

7.18

6-42

.84

CDS-A

39.38

12.63

10-70

.89

CDS-I

39.50

12.27

10-70

.88

PBS

38.09

8.53

7-49

.92

PS-O

20.92

8.91

6-42

.85

PS-H

32.61

6.08

12-42

.81

MPS-S

66.01

18.11

18-105

.91

MPS-O

54.99

13.89

16-95

.82

MPS-SP

54.14

15.09

15-102

.85

PDST Overall Positive 0.88

0.62

-1.25-3.76

PDST Overall

2.32

0.93

-0.81-4.92

PDST-AP
Negative
PDST-AN

0.50

0.42

-0.58-2.40

1.20

0.56

-0.33-2.48

PDST-IP

0.40

0.29

-0.67-1.84

PDST-IN

1.25

0.52

-0.49-2.49

Self-Schema Structure

Notes. N = 438-459 for all self-report measures. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, Activation
subscale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress
Scales – 21, Depression Subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment Subscale;
CDS-A = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale,
Interpersonal Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, Fulfillment Subscale; PS-O =
Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious Subscale; MPS-S =
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O = Multidimensional
Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale,
Socially Prescribed Subscale; PSDT = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP = Achievement
Positive; AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal Negative.
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Table 1.3a
Correlations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Content
DAS
HPS

CDS-A

.20*** .16**

CDS-I

PS-O

PS-H

MS-S

MS-O

MS-SP

PBS

.22***

.42***

-.05

.12*

.14**

.26***

-.01

Notes. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment Subscale; CDS-A = Cognitive
Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Interpersonal
Subscale; PS-O = Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious Subscale;
MPS-S = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O =
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional
Perfectionism Scale, Socially Prescribed Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale,
Fulfillment Subscale.*p < .05, **p < .01
Table 1.3b
Correlations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Structure

HPS

PDST-P

PDST-AP

PDST-SP

PDST-N

PDST-AN

PDST-SN

-.22***

-.21***

-.19***

-.02

.06

-.09

Notes. PDST = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; P = Overall Positive; N = Overall Negative;
AP = Positive Achievement, AN = Negative Achievement, IP = Positive Interpersonal, IN =
Negative Interpersonal. ***p < .01
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Similarly, in Table 1.3b, it is illustrated that mania risk also shared significant relationships
with self-schema structure domains. In line with expectations, high HPS scores corresponded with
tightly organized content that was positive in valence. More specifically, higher HPS scores were
associated with highly interconnected, positive content within the achievement and interpersonal
domains. Notably, all the above correlations between the HPS and PDST positive domains were
small in magnitude. Somewhat inconsistent with hypotheses, mania risk did not correlate with the
organization of negative self-schema content. However, as an aside, it was observed that total scores
on the HPS (versus HPS Activation scores) shared a small relationship with negative, interpersonally
relevant content, r = -.15, p = .01. The direction of this relation suggests that high total HPS scores
corresponded with tightly interconnected, negative content within the interpersonal domain.
Predicting Self-Schema Aspects from Mania Risk
In order to further understand how self-schema constructs (both content and structure) may
distinguish those at heightened vulnerability towards mania, it is critical to parse the contribution of
mood symptoms from the relation between mania risk and self-schema aspects. Thus, a number of
block regression analyses were conducted to examine how self-schema constructs may be
distinctively related to mania risk. For each hierarchical regression analysis, depressive and manic
symptoms were entered in the first and second block, respectively, before mania risk was entered in
the third block.
Schema Content. The results of the regression analyses for the self-schema content measures
are displayed in Table 1.4. These findings indicate that mania risk significantly added to the
prediction of several content measures, even after controlling for the presence of mood symptoms.
Specifically, after manic and depressive symptoms had been taken into account, high risk for mania
corresponded with greater endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes concerning goal attainment,
qualities indicative of obsessive passion, and socially prescribed perfectionism. In the third block of
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Table 1.4
Summary of Regression Results for Self-Schema Content
Schema
Content

Block 1

Block 2
Change

Block 3
Change

Overall Model and
Predictors

Dysfunctional
Attitudes –
Goal
Attainment

F = 0.01
R2 = .00

ΔF = 9.84**
ΔR2 = .02

ΔF = 7.44***
ΔR2 = .03

F = 5.81***
R2 = .04
Depression (-.03)
Mania (.08)
Mania Risk (.15)**

Cognitive
Distortions –
Achievement

F = 107.64***
R2 = .20

ΔF = 10.98***
ΔR2 = .02

ΔF = 1.60
ΔR2 = .00

F = 40.99***
R2 = .23
Depression (.44)***
Mania (.11)*
Mania Risk (.06)

Cognitive
Distortions –
Interpersonal

F = 105.15***
R2 = .20

ΔF = 16.43***
ΔR2 = .03

ΔF = 6.87**
ΔR2 = .01

F = 40.99***
R2 = .25
Depression (.43)***
Mania (.11)*
Mania Risk (.13)**

Adaptive
Beliefs about
Achievement

F = 369.88***
R2 = .47

ΔF = 6.80**
ΔR2 = .01

ΔF = 0.22
ΔR2 = .00

F = 127.10***
R2 = .48
Depression (-.69)***
Mania (.08)*
Mania Risk (.02)

Obsessive
Passion

F = 4.43*
R2 = .01

ΔF = 64.18***
ΔR2 = .13

ΔF = 36.49***
ΔR2 = .07

F = 37.25***
R2 = .21
Depression (.06)
Mania (.22)***
Mania Risk (.30)**

Harmonious
Passion

F = 64.43***
R2 = .14

ΔF = 2.27
ΔR2 = .01

ΔF = 0.20
ΔR2 = .00

F = 22.32***
R2 = .15
Depression (-.37)***
Mania (-.08)
Mania Risk (.02)
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Self-Oriented
Perfectionism

F = 0.63
R2 = .00

ΔF = 2.15
ΔR2 = .00

ΔF = 3.50
ΔR2 = .04

F = 2.10
R2 = .02
Depression (.03)
Mania (.02)
Mania Risk (.11)

Other-Oriented
Perfectionism

F = 0.37
R2 = .00

ΔF = 15.14***
ΔR2 = .04

ΔF = 1.04
ΔR2 = .00

F = 5.52**
R2 = .04
Depression (.01)
Mania (.16)**
Mania Risk (.06)

Socially
Prescribed
Perfectionism

F = 49.05***
R2 = .11

ΔF = 19.12****
ΔR2 = .04

ΔF = 10.82***
ΔR2 = .02

F = 27.64***
R2 = .18
Depression (.30)***
Mania (.12)*
Mania Risk (.17)***

Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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the regression analysis, mania risk also positively predicted cognitive distortions within the
interpersonal domain. Contrary to expectations, the HPS did not predict achievement cognitive
distortions once mood symptoms had been controlled for, despite the previously reported, positive
relation shared between these constructs. This result can likely be explained by the strong
contribution of recent depressive symptoms; depression was consistently a strong predictor of
cognitive distortions within both the interpersonal and achievement domains. Finally, mania risk did
not significantly add to the prediction of adaptive self-referent beliefs about achievement,
harmonious passion, nor self-oriented or other-oriented perfectionism.
As further illustrated in Table 1.4, mood symptoms also frequently added to the prediction of
self-schema content. In particular, depression was a moderate to strong predictor of the majority of
content constructs. This is not surprisingly since many of these scales were designed to examine
depressogenic cognition, and such relationships have been well documented in the literature (e.g.,
Covin et al., 2011). Since one of the goals of this dissertation is to isolate self-schema aspects that
appear to be distinctly related to mania, notable are findings that exclusively implicate manic
symptoms and/or mania risk. As displayed in Table 1.4, dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment
and obsessive passion represent cases in which depressive symptoms was not a significant predictor,
once mania constructs have been entered into the regression equation. As such, these findings
contribute to discriminant validity, suggesting that these content measures are particularly important
for understanding self-referent beliefs within the context of mania.
Schema Structure. The regression results for schema structure components are presented in
Table 1.5. First, mania risk significantly predicted the organization of overall positive schema
content, beyond the contributions of recent mood symptoms. Notably, although depression
corresponded with loosely connected, positive content, recent manic symptoms as well as mania risk
corresponded with tightly interconnected positive content. Alternatively, only recent depressive
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Table 1.5.
Summary of Regression Results for Self-Schema Structure
Schema
Structure

Block 1

Block 2
Change

Block 3
Change

Overall Model and
Predictors

Overall
Positive

F = 57.26***
R2 = .12

ΔF = 39.49***
ΔR2 = .07

ΔF = 12.71***
ΔR2 = .03

F = 37.64***
R2 = .22
Depression (.37)***
Mania (-.19)***
Mania Risk (-.17)***

Positive
Achievement

F = 38.36***
R2 = .08

ΔF = 23.88***
ΔR2 = .05

ΔF = 12.36***
ΔR2 = .03

F = 26.08***
R2 = .15
Depression (.31)***
Mania (-.14)**
Mania Risk (-.17)***

Positive
Interpersonal

F = 50.86***
R2 = .10

ΔF = 30.05***
ΔR2 = .06

ΔF = 8.11**
ΔR2 = .02

F = 31.24***
R2 = .17
Depression (.34)***
Mania (-.18)***
Mania Risk (-.14)**

Overall
Negative

F = 74.07***
R2 = .22

ΔF = 0.83
ΔR2 = .00

ΔF = 1.09
ΔR2 = .00

F = 25.32***
R2 = .22
Depression (-.46)***
Mania (.09)
Mania Risk (-.07)

Negative
Achievement

F = 71.18***
R2 = .20

ΔF = 5.39*
ΔR2 = .02

ΔF = 0.00
ΔR2 = .00

F = 25.81***
R2 = .22
Depression (-.44)***
Mania (.12)*
Mania Risk (.00)

Negative
Interpersonal

F = 63.98***
R2 = .16

ΔF = 0.04
ΔR2 = .00

ΔF = 3.38+
ΔR2 = .01

F = 22.54***
R2 = .17
Depression (-.39)***
Mania (.07)
Mania Risk (-.12)+

Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.
*p < .05, *p < .01, ***p < .001, +p = .06.
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symptoms significantly predicted overall negative self-schema structure when all constructs were
entered in the final block of the regression analysis.
Positive Domains. When examining more specific domains of self-schema structure, mania
risk significantly predicted the organization of positive content within the achievement domain after
controlling for the influence of recent mood symptoms. HPS scores corresponded with highly
interconnected content within the interpersonal domain as well. In both cases, manic
symptomatology was also associated with tightly organized, positive content. Conversely, recent
depressive symptoms corresponded with loosely organized, positive content within these domains,
which is consistent with past research.
Negative Domains. Contrary to tentative hypotheses, the HPS was not a significant predictor
of negative achievement structure or interpersonal structure after accounting for the influence of
mood symptoms. However, the trend for negative interpersonal structure (p = .06) showed the
expected pattern, whereby high mania risk corresponded with highly interconnected negative
content. Conversely, greater endorsement of recent manic symptoms corresponded with less
connectivity within the achievement domain, but not the interpersonal domain. Greater depressive
symptoms corresponded with highly interconnected negative content within both domains.
Examining the Effects of Mood Priming on the Activation of Self-Schema Content
To address the second research question of this dissertation, a set of multiple regression
analyses was conducted to examine whether the positive mood induction procedure moderated
relations between mania risk and self-schema content. To derive the predictors for these analyses, the
MIP was numerically coded and the HPS was mean-centered. A product term was then calculated for
the interaction effect.
A summary of these analyses is presented in Table 1.6. As this table illustrates, there were no
significant interaction effects associated with any of the self-schema content measures. Overall, these
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Table 1.6
Summary of Moderation Analyses examining the Effects of Mood Induction Procedures on the
Activation of Self-Schema Content
Schema Content
Dysfunctional Attitudes –
Goal Attainment

Predictors

Overall Model

HPS (.29)***
MIP (.09)
HPS x MIP (-.11)
HPS (.34)***
MIP (.04)
HPS x MIP (.06)

F = 8.37***
R2 = .06

Cognitive Distortions –
Achievement

HPS (.21)**
MIP (.08)
HPS x MIP (.01)

F = 7.49***
R2 = .05

Self-Referent Adaptive
Beliefs - Achievement

HPS (-.02)**
MIP (.04)**
HPS x MIP (-.06)**

F = 0.80
R2 = .01

Obsessive Passion

HPS (.44)***
MIP (.01)
HPS x MIP (-.09)

F = 27.25**
R2 = .17

Harmonious Passion

HPS (.00)
MIP (-.04)
HPS x MIP (.06)

F = 1.54
R2 = .01

Self-Oriented
Perfectionism

HPS (.23)**
MIP (.09)
HPS x MIP (-.03)

F = 7.34***
R2 = .05

Other-Oriented
Perfectionism

HPS (.27)***
MIP (.07)
HPS x MIP (-.05)

F = 8.83***
R2 = .06

Socially Prescribed
Perfectionism

HPS (.34)***
MIP (.09)
HPS x MIP (-.04)

F = 16.32***
R2 = .11

Cognitive Distortions –
Interpersonal

F = 13.68**
R2 = .09

Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; MIP = Positive Mood Induction Procedure;
HPS x MIP = Interaction between HPS and MIP. Values in parentheses represent corresponding
standardized regression coefficients. **p < .01, ***p < .001

46

findings indicate that the positive mood induction procedure did not impact the examination of selfschema content in the current study. As such, mood priming may not be necessary to detect these
aspects of self-schema content showing sensitivity and/or specificity to mania.
Self-Schema Components Mediate Maladaptive Pathways to Mood Symptoms
To further assess the importance of self-schema content and structure in relation to mania
constructs, it was examined whether self-schema components could help to explain the relation
between mania risk and mood symptoms. Recall that the current measure of mania risk (i.e., HPS)
indexes a stable pattern of cognitive, behavioural and emotional experiences that predicts onset of
clinically significant manic symptoms, and the ASRM and DASS-21 assess the recent incidence of
manic/depressive symptoms. Thus, it would be helpful to understand how self-schema components
as potential mediators may elucidate the relation between a vulnerability marker (i.e., HPS) and the
occurrence of mood symptoms. As such, multiple mediation analyses were conducted utilizing the
procedures outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This approach permitted analysis of the
estimated indirect (i.e., mediated) effects, as well as the direct effect of the predictor (i.e., mania risk)
on the criterion variable (i.e., mood symptoms) while controlling for the mediators within the model.
Separate mediation analyses were conducted predicting manic symptoms and depressive
symptoms, using the bootstrap sampling procedures developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This
bootstrap method involves drawing a large number of samples (n = 1000) from the dataset using
replacement, such that path coefficients can be calculated for each sample. The result is that mean
direct and indirect effects and their confidence intervals (CIs) can be calculated on the basis of these
sample estimates. The CIs are used to determine the statistical significance of the effects within the
mediation model. In the current dissertation, if the value for a given effect (i.e., indirect or direct) did
not fall within the 95% CI, it was concluded that this result was statistically significant at the p < .05
level.
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In addition, since the following mediation analyses were conducted using cross-sectional
data, reverse mediation models were also conducted exchanging the predictor and criterion variables.
This approach was used to examine whether further empirical support could be found for these
mediation models that are based on theoretical considerations.
Manic Symptoms. First, it was examined whether certain types of self-schema content and
structure mediated between the HPS and manic symptoms. In light of the earlier regression results
highlighting relations between mania risk and dysfunctional attitudes about success, obsessive
passion, and socially prescribed perfectionism, these content constructs were examined as potential
mediators for manic symptoms. Overall positive self-schema structure was also entered within this
multiple mediation model. As displayed in Figure 1.1, results indicated that obsessive passion,
perfectionism, and positive self-schema structure partially mediated the relation between mania risk
and manic symptoms. These results were in the expected direction, with high mania risk
corresponding with greater obsessive passion, higher levels of perfectionism, and highly
interconnected positive self-schema content, which in turn predicted greater manic symptoms.
Notably, when the reverse model was tested whereby manic symptoms served as the predictor
variable and mania risk as the criterion variable, the regression coefficients and indirect effects
looked similar to the theorized model (see Appendix E for details). However, one exception was that
the indirect effect for positive self-schema structure was not significant in the reverse model (CI = .0014 to .0548).
Depressive Symptoms. Given previous research that heavily implicates cognitive distortions
within the context of depressive symptoms, a sub-hypothesis was that cognitive distortions in the
achievement domain may follow from mania risk, but lead to depressive symptoms rather than manic
symptoms. As displayed in Figure 1.2, meditational results supported this hypothesis and indicated
that cognitive distortions within both the Achievement and Interpersonal domains fully mediated the
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Figure 1.1
Self-Schema Content and Structure Mediate between Mania Risk and Manic Symptoms

Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Positive
0.18***

Perfectionism

0.27***
0.42***

Mania Risk

0.02
0.10*

Obsessive
Passion
Positive

0.18***

Manic Symptoms

0.47*** (0.33***)

-0.22***

Positive
Structure
Positive

-0.17***

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional Attitudes, β = -.00;
Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism, β = .03*; Obsessive Passion, β = .08*; Overall Positive Structure,
β = .04*; Total indirect effect, β = .14*. *p < .05, ***p < .001.
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Figure 1.2
Cognitive Distortions Mediate between Mania Risk and Depressive Symptoms

0.16***

Mania Risk

Achievement
Cognitive
Distortions

0.26***

Depressive
Symptoms

0.10* (0.01)

0.23***

Interpersonal
Cognitive
Distortions

0.23**

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement Cognitive Distortions,
β = .04*; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .05*; Total indirect effect, β = .09*. *p < .05,
**p < .01, ***p < .001.
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relation between the HPS and depressive symptoms. Specifically, the results of these analyses
indicate that greater mania risk predicted high levels of cognitive distortions, which, in turn,
predicted greater depressive symptoms. Moreover, neither achievement cognitive distortions (CI = .0153 to .0361) nor interpersonal cognitive distortions (CI = -.0247 to .0500) significantly mediated
between the HPS and manic symptoms.
Again, the reverse model was also tested (i.e., depressive symptoms as the predictor variable
and mania risk as the criterion variable), since the above results for the theorized model are crosssectional. As shown in Appendix E, for the reverse model, achievement cognitive distortions was not
a significant mediator between depressive symptoms and mania risk (CI = -.1257 and .0366). In
addition, the total indirect effects for both models were identical. Thus, it does not appear that the
reverse model is superior to the theorized model in the current study.
Adaptive Self-Schema Components as Moderators of Paths to Mood Symptoms
Recall that it was also hypothesized that adaptive self-schema components (i.e., adaptive
beliefs about success and harmonious passion) could potentially moderate pathways towards mood
symptoms. A moderation effect was explored since it was not necessarily anticipated that there
would be direct associations between the HPS and these protective constructs. Rather, it was
theorized that there may be a subgroup of individuals at high risk for mania who display lower levels
of mood symptoms at high levels of these adaptive self-schema constructs.
To examine potential moderation effects, a multiple regression approach was employed
utilizing centered values of the predictors. These results indicated that the interaction between
harmonious passion and manic symptoms was not significant, β = -.06, t = -1.46, p = .08. However,
the observed trend was in line with the hypothesis that harmonious passion acts as a protective factor
among those with temperamental vulnerability towards mania. As displayed in Figure 1.3, it
appeared that the slope representing high versus low levels of harmonious passion was less steep,
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despite tests of simple slopes indicating that both slopes were significantly different from zero. Of
note, the two main effects were significant, whereby high levels of mania risk and low levels of
harmonious passion corresponded with greater manic symptoms. Together, these results suggest that
mania risk was positively associated with manic symptoms, but there was a trend where this
association may have been weaker among those showing high versus low levels of harmonious
passion (see Figure 1.3).
Regarding the other possible moderation effects involving adaptive constructs, adaptive
beliefs about success also did not significantly moderate between mania risk and symptoms, β = -.05,
t = -1.22, p = .22. Moreover, harmonious passion (β = -.02, t = -0.41, p = .68) and PBS (β = .01, t =
0.40, p = .68) did not significantly moderate between the HPS and depressive symptoms.
Summary of Major Findings
Findings of this study suggest that manic self-schemas are characterized by maladaptive
content, and particularly content that is relevant to goal-striving and achievement. Even after
controlling for the influence of mood symptoms, temperamental risk for mania was associated with
dysfunctional beliefs about goal attainment, obsessive passion, and a subtype of perfectionism
(other-oriented perfectionism). However, results of the current investigation also indicate that
cognitive distortions in interpersonal, rather than achievement contexts, are more predictive of mania
risk after accounting for manic and depressive symptoms.
Notably, this cross-sectional examination in Study 1 also suggests that certain aspects of selfschema structure correspond with mania risk. In particular, the hypomanic personality was associated
with highly interconnected positive content, within both the achievement and interpersonal domains,
after accounting for manic and depressive symptoms. Contrary to predictions, mania risk as assessed
by the Activation subscale of the HPS did not also correspond with highly consolidated negative
self-schema content. However, regression results did approach significance (p < .06), in line with
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Figure 1.3
Harmonious Passion Moderates the Relation between Mania Risk and Symptoms

8
7

Manic Symptoms

6
5
4

Low
Harmonious
Passion

3

High
Harmonious
Passion

2
1
Low HPS

High HPS

Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. *** = p < .01.
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mania risk predicting tightly organized negative content within the interpersonal domain.
Moreover, the results of this study suggest that self-schema constructs could help to explain
pathways leading to mood symptoms. Specifically, positive self-schema structure, obsessive passion,
and socially-prescribed perfectionism partially mediated relations between mania risk and manic
symptoms, whereas cognitive distortions fully mediated between mania risk and depressive
symptoms. Study 1 also provided some preliminary evidence that adaptive constructs relevant to
goal-striving (i.e., harmonious passion) may have a role in dampening manic symptoms among those
at heightened risk for mania.
Contrary to hypotheses, the above findings did not suggest that mood induction procedures
increased the sensitivity with which manic self-schemas could be examined. Thus, it may not be
necessary to employ these procedures while studying the types of self-schema content included in the
present research.
Despite the promising findings of Study 1 that help to elucidate self-schema characteristics
associated with mania, a number of limitations need to be addressed. In particular, an important
extension of Study1 would be a longitudinal examination, in order to more rigorously investigate the
role of self-schema components within a vulnerability framework of mania. For instance, if selfschema components could predict prospective increases in manic symptoms, this finding would
further support the predictive utility of schema constructs.
Moreover, a question that still remains unanswered is how these self-schema components
representing putative risk factors may interact with life events to give rise to mood symptoms among
those at high mania risk. This consideration is critical to address from the perspective of a cognitive
vulnerability-stress model.
In addition, since this is one of the first known studies to examine self-schema organization in
relation to mania, the temporal stability of self-schema structure is largely unknown. This is
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particularly important to investigate within the context of mania, since previous research on bipolar
disorder suggests that it may be associated with an unstable view of self (e.g., highly fluctuating
levels of self-esteem; Bentall et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2007; van der Gucht et al., 2009).
Finally, since Study 1 represents a preliminary investigation of self-schema characteristics, it
would be important to examine whether these results can be replicated and do not simply reflect
spurious findings. Since the effect sizes associated with many of the major findings are quite small,
this adds to the need for replication in order to consider the meaningfulness of results.
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Chapter 3
Study 2: A Longitudinal Examination
Study 2 provides a longitudinal examination of the various potential relationships between
manic risk, self-schema constructs (content and structure) and life events across four separate timepoints, each two-weeks apart. The four different time-points of Study 2 allows for a temporal
examination of a range of potential effects concerning mania risk, the self-schema, life events, and
mood symptomatology. In particular, Study 2 provides an initial empirical examination of a
cognitive vulnerability-stress process that can be modeled and evaluated. As such, this longitudinal
component of Study 2 directly addresses the third and fourth research questions of this dissertation,
namely, to assess how the self-schema may predict changes in manic symptomatology over time, and
how aspects of self-schema content and structure may interact with life events to differentially
influence symptoms among individuals at varying levels of mania risk. In addition, the crosssectional components of Study 2 provide an opportunity for a replication test of the main findings of
Study 1, but with a different sample. This cross-sectional replication addresses the sixth research
question of this dissertation.
Study 2 used a high-risk design to more sensitively examine the above research questions.
This approach involved oversampling from individuals showing high levels of temperamental
vulnerability for mania (i.e., high HPS scores), to increase statistical power and promote comparison
among individuals at different levels of mania risk. In addition, mood symptoms and life events were
measured at multiple time-points and were considered in relation to the cognitive constructs.
Research Question 3: Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood
symptoms?
Study 2 further addresses this research question by testing self-schema components as robust
predictors of the course of manic symptoms. Within a longitudinal design, this is possible by
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assessing whether aspects of self-schema content and structure predicted future increases in manic
symptoms. A paucity of research has utilized longitudinal or prospective designs to examine
psychological vulnerability mechanisms in mania, which is the ‘gold standard’ approach. Moreover,
no known investigations have examined the potential role of self-schema organization in predicting
future manic symptoms. Assessing the predictive utility of self-schema components is important for
gauging their potential as vulnerability factors and for addressing methodological limitations.
Regarding the latter, if self-schema components predicted prospective increases in manic symptoms,
this would seriously challenge methodological concerns that self-schema findings can be solely
explained by concurrent manic symptomatology.
Hypotheses. It was hypothesized that self-schema structure would robustly predict the course
of manic symptoms. This hypothesis was informed by research on depression, which has established
that self-schema organization is an enduring vulnerability factor, as well as a stronger predictor of
future mood episodes compared to self-schema content (Dozois, 2007). In the case of mania, it was
anticipated that positive self-schema structure, rather than negative, would be prospectively
associated with future manic symptoms. To a lesser extent, it was predicted that self-schema content
may also predict future changes in manic symptoms.
Temporal Stability of Schema Structure. A secondary research question of Study 2
concerns the temporal stability of self-schema structure in mania. The longitudinal design of this
study also allows for a preliminary investigation of this question. Phenomenological characteristics
of bipolar disorder (e.g., fluctuations in mood and self-esteem) suggest that the organization of selfbeliefs may be prone to change, despite general assumptions that self-schema structure is a relatively
stable feature. For instance, findings concerning the temporal stability of self-esteem provide indirect
evidence concerning the organization of an individual’s self-referent beliefs. In particular, research
has demonstrated that mania is associated with high fluctuations in self-esteem, which are apparent
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outside of mood episodes (Bentall et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2007; van der Gucht et al., 2009).
Thus, it was hypothesized that participants at a high risk for mania would show some change in the
organization of self-schema content across time, in addition to unstable self-esteem levels, relative to
individuals at lower levels of risk. This longitudinal component of the research also permits
examination of the interplay between self-schema structure and self-esteem levels over time.
Research Question 4: Do self-schema components interact with congruent life events to predict
the course of mood symptoms among those at high risk for mania?
As reviewed in the General Introduction, prior studies have begun to examine life events that
may trigger manic symptoms. In particular, research has pointed to the role of achievement and goalstriving events in the course of manic symptoms (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008; Nusslock et al., 2007).
Consistent with a reward sensitivity model of mania (see Johnson et al., 2012), a subset of events has
also been conceptualized as BAS-Activating (Urošević et al., 2010).
Recall that very limited research has considered the potential interaction between cognitive
vulnerability factors and life events in relation to mania. Thus, a major focus of Study 2 is to address
this consideration, in keeping with a cognitive vulnerability model of mania. Moreover, in light of
the current operationalization of mania risk, it is also important to examine whether these patterns
operate differently among those at varying levels of mania risk.
Hypotheses. Given past research and Study 1 findings, a broad hypothesis of Study 2 was that
positive life events would interact with positive self-schema components to predict future manic
symptoms, specifically among those at heightened risk for mania. Thus, it was predicted that a threeway interaction between self-schema constructs, life events, and mania risk would be observed. It
was again anticipated in Study 2 that self-schema structure would be a robust predictor showing
these associations. As such, a core hypothesis was that highly interconnected, positive self-schema
content would correspond with future increases in manic symptoms when activated by positive life
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events, and among those at high risk for mania, in particular. Regarding the specific nature of
positive events, it was predicted that goal attainment and BAS-Activating events would be the
strongest predictors of future manic symptoms. Conversely, it was not anticipated that negative life
events would trigger manic symptoms in conjunction with positive schema components.
Research Question 5: Can major findings regarding self-schema components and their relation
to mania show replication?
Study 2 also begins to address the final research question of this dissertation by considering
whether the cross-sectional results from Study 1 could be replicated in a similar sample. Thus, it was
anticipated that the major findings of Study 2 would show replication, whereby both self-schema
content and structure would predict concurrent manic symptoms, after accounting for the influence of
recent mood symptoms. In addition, it was also hypothesized in Study 2 that self-schema constructs
would similarly clarify the nature of pathways towards mood symptoms in mania by showing a
mediating role in certain maladaptive pathways; and then showing a moderating role for self-schema
content conceptualized as protective factors (i.e., Harmonious Passion and adaptive beliefs about
success).
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Study 2 – Method
Participants
The Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program was again utilized to recruit participants.
Similar to Study 1, only individuals from predominantly English-speaking countries were permitted
to sign-up for Study 2. Likewise, only individuals with an MTurk approval rating of 95% or above
were able to complete the task.
A total of 996 participants (567 females, 429 males) completed Time 1 of this longitudinal
study. Of the participants who completed Time 1, only 180 participants were invited to return for
Times 2, 3, and 4, occurring 2, 4, or 6 weeks later, respectively. The goal was to identify a large
number of high-scorers on the HPS at Time 1 and to retain these participants within the longitudinal
sample, since high scores (HPS ≥ 33) are typically infrequent within the general population. Thus, an
equal proportion of participants at different levels of the HPS (i.e., high risk: HPS ≥ 33, moderate
risk: 32 ≤ HPS ≥ 21, and low risk: HPS ≤ 20) were randomly selected from the pool of Time 1
participants and invited to complete the remaining study sessions. A summary of the sample
demographics can be found in Table 2.1. There were no notable demographic differences between
the initial and retained sample.
Overall, a total of 139 participants (75 females, 64 males) completed Time 2, 137 participants
(72 females, 65 males) completed Time 3, and 126 participants (63 females, 63 males) completed
Time 4. Of those participants who completed Time 2-4, only 15% fell within the high risk group (26
participants). As such, fewer than anticipated ‘high risk’ participants completed the entire study.
Participants were compensated $0.50, $1.50, $2.00, and $2.00 for completing Times 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively.
Careful responding questions were used in a similar manner as Study 1 to assess the attention
of participants completing the study. One or two careful responding questions were interspersed
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Table 2.1
Demographic Characteristics of Sample across the Longitudinal Study
Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

Time 4

Age

11% (18-24 yrs)
38% (25-34 yrs)
25% (35-44 yrs)
12% (45-54 yrs)
14% (55-74 yrs)

8% (18-24 yrs)
42% (25-34 yrs)
25% (35-44 yrs)
10% (45-54 yrs)
15% (55-74 yrs)

6% (18-24 yrs)
44% (25-34 yrs)
24% (35-44 yrs)
10% (45-54 yrs)
16% (55-74 yrs)

10% (18-24 yrs)
42% (25-34 yrs)
24% (35-44 yrs)
9% (45-54 yrs)
15% (55-74 yrs)

Ethnicity

74% (White)
10% (Black)
5% (Hispanic)
8% (Asian)
3% (Other)

75% (White)
7% (Black)
7% (Hispanic)
7% (Asian)
4% (Other)

76% (White)
7% (Black)
6% (Hispanic)
7% (Asian)
4% (Other)

75% (White)
8% (Black)
6% (Hispanic)
7% (Asian)
4% (Other)

Country

98.5% (US)
1% (Canada)
0.5% (Australia)

100% (US)

100% (US)

100% (US)

Education

0.5% (HS)
8% (HS diploma)
4% (Voc. training)
19% (College)
68.5% (College
degree)

1% (HS)
12% (HS diploma)
6% (Voc. training)
17% (College)
64% (College
degree)

1% (HS)
13% (HS diploma)
5% (Voc. training)
15% (College)
66% (College
degree)

12% (HS diploma)
4% (Voc. training)
16% (College)
68% (College
degree)

Mental
Health
History

24% dx
6.5% multiple dx
20% current dx
20% family history
of BD

27% dx
10% multiple dx
23% current dx
25% family history
of BD

27% dx
10% multiple dx
23% current dx
24% family history
of BD

25% dx
10% multiple dx
22% current dx
24% family history
of BD

Notes. All demographic information was self-reported. Yrs = years; US = United States; HS = some
high school completed; HS diploma = high school diploma; voc. training = trade/technical/vocational
training; college = some college completed; dx = past self-reported diagnosis of mental disorder;
current dx = current self-reported diagnosis of mental disorder; family history of BD = self-reported
family history of bipolar disorder.
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within the questionnaires for each time-point, depending on the length of the study session. If
participants answered one or more of these questions incorrectly, they were not invited to complete
Time 2-4, and their results were excluded from study analyses (n = 3).
Materials
A summary of the materials and the timing of their administration in Study 2 is shown in
Figure 2.1. The 6-week longitudinal period was chosen primarily because the life events measure
included in this study probed for events occurring over the previous four weeks (see below for
further details of this measure). Thus, four weeks was the minimum required length for the study
period, in order to assess change in mood symptoms as a function of life events reported by
participants. However, given the overall objectives of this study, a 6-week time period was chosen.
Here, participants were asked to complete one study session every two weeks, for a total of four
sessions. This two-week interval between time-points was intended to provide sufficient opportunity
to observe the incidence of mood symptoms among participants.
Risk for Mania. Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). The HPS
has been described previously. Cut-off scores used to delineate high (HPS ≥ 33) and low (HPS ≤ 21)
mania risk have been well validated by previous research (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Kwapil et al.,
2000). In particular, a number of studies suggest that cases of high-risk scorers generalize to clinical
samples of diagnosed bipolar disorder (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2000; Merikangas et al., 2007). The
current study did not exclude participants who fell between these cut-offs (32 ≤ HPS ≥ 21) and
ostensibly fit within a ‘moderate risk’ category, in order to permit examination of a wide range of
effects. Similar to Study 1, the HPS was utilized as a continuous measure of mania risk within
statistical analyses. The HPS was administered only during Time 1 of this study.
Current Mood Symptoms. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman et al., 1997). The
ASRM has also been described previously in Study 1. This scale was administered at each of the four
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Figure 2.1
Schematic Representation of Timeline and Design of Study

Baseline

Time 1:
o Demographics
o HPS
o ASRM
o DASS-21

2 weeks

4 weeks

Time 2:
o ASRM
o DASS-21
o PDST
o LES
o RSEI

Time 3:
o ASRM
o DASS-21
o PDST
o MIP
o CDS
o PBS
o RSEI

6 weeks

Time 4:
o ASRM
o DASS-21
o LES
o RSEI

Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale;
DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21, Depression subscale; LES = Life Events
Survey; RSEI = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; CDS = Cognitive Distortions Scale; PBS =
Positive Belief Statements Scale.
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time-points of the present study to probe the presence of manic symptoms over the previous week.
Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 Depression subscale, described previously in Study 1, was also
administered at each of the four time-points of Study 2 to assess participants’ level of depressive
symptoms over the previous week. See Study 1 for more detailed information about this scale.
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson,
2001b). The PDST was once again employed as a measure of self-schema structure in the current
study. Participants were asked to complete this task at two time-points (i.e., Time 2 and Time 3), in
order to examine reliability of self-schema structure measurement, in addition to investigating other
relations of interest. Further information about the PDST is provided in Study 1.
Self-Schema Content. Belief Statements Questionnaire – Fulfillment subscale (Hillson,
1997). This subscale of the Beliefs Statements Questionnaire was administered to participants during
Time 3 of the present study to assess for the presence of adaptive beliefs related to achievement. For
further information about this measure, see Study 1.
Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS; Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011). Similar to
Study 1, the CDS was utilized in the present study to examine cognitive distortions among
individuals at different levels of mania risk. More detailed information about this measure can be
found in Study 1.
Life Events. Life Events Scale (LES; Alloy & Clements, 1992; Needles & Abramson, 1990).
The Life Events Scale is a self-report measure that has been used in previous research to examine life
events that are highly relevant to mania. An expanded version of this scale was employed in the
present research, similar to the approach taken by previous researchers (e.g., Bender et al., 2010).
This version of the LES was used because it contains a longer, 193-item form that probes for
various kinds of life events that are not exclusive to negative or ‘stressful’ events. This is important,
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given previous findings implicating certain positive life events (i.e., achievement, BAS-activating
events) in the course of manic symptoms. In the current study, the LES probed for events occurring
over the previous 4 weeks. As seen in Figure 2.1, this scale was administered at Times 2 and 4 in
order to assess the relation between life events and mood symptoms (at Time 2), as well as life
events and change in mood symptoms (i.e., change in symptoms from Time 2 to Time 4, based on
life events reported at Time 4).
The LES’s 193 items probe for events occurring in a number of different life domains (e.g.,
education, employment, finances, housing, caretaking, family, interpersonal/romantic relationships).
The specified events vary along a number of dimensions, including valence (i.e., positive, negative)
and content (e.g., achievement, interpersonal). A number of events were also intended to correspond
with BAS Activation (e.g., Positive evaluation of work performance by someone other than a family
member or a friend [e.g., yearly review, concert review in newspaper, etc.]), BAS Deactivation (e.g.,
Betrayed by boyfriend/ girlfriend/ spouse [e.g., lied to; cheated; important promise broken]), and
Goal Attainment (e.g., Finished an important project, task, or venture that is related to school, work,
hobby, etc.). Previous research has validated these categories using a priori team ratings, which have
been associated with good interrater agreement. In particular, the consistencies among three
independent raters were as follows: α = .79 for BAS Activation, α = .94 for BAS Deactivation, and α
= .91 for Goal Attainment (Urošević, et al., 2011). Likewise, rating schemes have also been
developed and validated to address the objective impact of events. Based on the consensus of
independent raters, Objective Impact Ratings (OIRs) have been developed for each life event along a
4-point scale, ranging from 0(no or slight impact) to 4(extreme impact) (Bender et al., 2010).
At the beginning of the LES questionnaire, general instructions ask participants to indicate
whether the specified events occurred over the past 4 weeks, regardless of how they “responded to,
coped with, or felt after an event or situation”, and whether or not they consider the event or
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situation “important”. Specifically, participants are asked to select No, did not occur or Yes, did
occur for each life event presented (e.g., Kicked out of school; Received an "A" on an exam or major
project in an important class; Put off major current life goal due to lack of money e.g., going to
school; moving out of parents' house; etc.; Began relationship with new boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse).
If participants selected Yes, did occur for a given event, they were then asked to indicate the number
of occurrences of the event.
The LES has demonstrated good reliability and validity (e.g., Alloy, Reilly-Harrington, et al.,
1999; Francis-Raniere et al., 2006, Safford et al., 2007). The gold-standard for administering this tool
to index and contextualize life events is to use an accompanying interview (Francis-Raniere et al.,
2006). Since this was an initial examination of life events as they pertain to mania and self-schema
constructs, and high levels of recruitment were prioritized given the low base rate of high HPS
scorers, only the self-report measure was used in this dissertation as a measure of life events.
Self-Esteem Variability. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSEI; Rosenberg, 1965). The
RSEI was administered to participants at Times 2 to 4 to examine self-esteem stability over time.
This self-report instrument consists of 10 items (e.g., I am able to do things as well as most other
people, All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure). For each item, participants were asked to
rate the statement using a 4-point Likert scale, from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. In a daily
diary version that has been used in previous research (e.g., Knowles et al., 2007), this scale prompts
respondents to consider their momentary self-esteem judgments (i.e., think of whether the statement
applies to them “as of right now”).
The RSEI is a widely used measure of self-esteem in psychological research studies. The
English version of this scale, as well as a number of its translations, have been associated with good
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (e.g., Martín-Albo et al., 2007; Sinclair et al., 2010). In
addition, the convergent validity of this measure is supported by numerous studies examining
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relationships between the RSEI and well-being indicators. For example, the RSEI has shown
negative relationships with constructs such as depression and perceived stress, and positive
relationships with life satisfaction and optimism (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001).
Mood Induction Procedure (MIP). The positive MIP (Tharp et al., 2016) that was utilized in
Study 1 was also employed in the present study. Since it was initially hypothesized that a positive
mood state would be necessary to activate mania-relevant cognitions, participants engaged in this
guided imagination task prior to completing measures of schema content. For more detailed
information about this task, please refer to Study 1 and Appendix B.
Procedure
Ethics approval for the study was granted prior to participant enrolment (see Appendix C).
MTurk users were able to view an advertisement and proceed to the study website if they met the
inclusion criteria. The Letter of Information contained details about the four study phases and
informed participants that they may or may not be asked to continue with the entire longitudinal
study. For each of the four time-points, participants were presented with an introductory video
similar to Study 1, in which the experimenter introduced herself and provided a brief description of
the activities for that phase. Participants were then directed to the relevant questionnaires and tasks,
which were presented in randomized order. The only exception was during Time 3, when the CDS
and PBS were always presented in the same sequential order following the MIP. The rationale for
this consistent ordering was described previously for Study 1. Finally, at the end of each study
session, participants were directed to a debriefing page with information about the project and when
they might be contacted about future study phases.
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Study 2 – Results and Discussion
The descriptive statistics (sample size, means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas) for the
major measures of Study 2 can be found in Appendix F, for each of the 4 time-points of the study.
Similar to Study 1, the present findings are consistent with values reported in previous research, with
the Study 2 measures also displaying good psychometric properties.
Replication Findings for Relations between Mania and Self-Schema Content and Structure
Overall, the results for the present study were consistent with Study 1 findings indicating that
significant relations exist between mania risk and self-schema components. The details of these
analyses are summarized in Table 2.2.
Structure. As shown in Table 2.2, block regression findings were replicated in Study 2 for
self-schema structure, suggesting that high mania risk corresponded with tightly organized, positive
self-schema content, even after controlling for recent mood symptoms. Significant effects were
observed in Study 2 for overall positive structure and achievement structure. However, these results
for positive interpersonal structure were non-significant in the present study.
In addition, mania risk did not add to the prediction of negative self-schema structure. This is
consistent with the results of Study 1, in which there was only a non-significant trend (p = .06)
associated with the HPS as a predictor of negative interpersonal structure. Of note, however, in Study
2 there was a significant bivariate correlation between mania risk and negative achievement structure,
r = -.24, p = .02. The direction of this relation is consistent with the non-significant trend observed in
Study 1, in which high mania risk corresponded with highly interconnected negative content.
Content. For the self-schema content measures included in the present study (i.e., CDS,
PBS), no significant effects of mania risk were observed within the block regression analyses (see
Table 2.2). This is somewhat inconsistent with Study 1 results, where a small, significant
contribution of the HPS was documented for self-schema cognitive distortions within the
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Table 2.2
Study 2 Replication of Regression Results for Self-Schema Constructs of Structure and Content
Self-Schema
Construct

Block 1

Block 2
Change

Block 3
Change

Overall Model and
Predictors

Overall
Positive
Structure

F = 21.47*** F-change = 6.19*
R2 = .14
R2 change = .04

F-change = 7.0**
R2 change = .05

F = 12.27***
R2 = .22
Depression (.43)***
Mania (-.15)+
Mania Risk (-.23)**

Positive
Achievement
Structure

F = 21.45*** F-change = 4.86*
R2 = .14
R2 change = .03

F-change = 7.94**
R2 change = .05

F = 12.12***
R2 = .22
Depression (.44)***
Mania (-.09)
Mania Risk (-.25)**

Positive
Interpersonal
Structure

F = 12.35**
R2 = .09

F-change = 2.82
R2 change = .02

F = 7.04**
R2 = .18
Depression (.33)***
Mania (-.14)
Mania Risk (-.16)+

F-change = 5.29*
R2 change = .04

Overall
Negative
Structure

F = 39.63*** F-change = 1.12
R2 = .32
R2 change = .01

F-change = 0.20
R2 change = .00

F = 13.54***
R2 = .33
Depression (-.59)***
Mania (-.11)
Mania Risk (.04)

Negative
Achievement
Structure

F = 48.33*** F-change = 1.33
R2 = .33
R2 change = .01

F-change = 0.06
R2 change = .00

F = 16.58
R2 = .18
Depression (-.60)***
Mania (-.10)
Mania Risk (.02)

Negative
Interpersonal
Structure

F = 21.43*** F-change = 0.80
R2 = .17
R2 change = .01

F-change = 0.20
R2 change = .00

F = 7.41
R2 = .17
Depression (-.44)***
Mania (-.09)
Mania Risk (.09)

69

Cognitive
Distortions –
Achievement

F = 22.58*** F-change = 5.34*
R2 = .17
R2 change = .04

F-change = 2.48
R2 change = .02

F = 10.55**
R2 = .23
Depression (.37)***
Mania (.18)*
Mania Risk (.14)

Cognitive
Distortions –
Interpersonal

F = 31.01*** F-change = 4.24*
R2 = .22
R2 change = .04

F-change = 1.34
R2 change = .01

F = 12.54***
R2 = .26
Depression (.44)***
Mania (.15)+
Mania Risk (.10)

Self-Referent
Adaptive
Beliefs Achievement

F = 55.10*** F-change = 0.01
R2 = .33
R2 change = .00

F-change = 1.18
R2 change = .01

F = 18.62***
R2 = .35
Depression (-.61)***
Mania (-.02)
Mania Risk (.09)

Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.
Depressive and manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and 2, respectively. To control for the role
of concurrent mood symptoms in Block 1 and 2, Time 2 depressive/manic symptoms were entered as
predictors for self-schema structure regression analyses, and Time 3 depressive/manic symptoms
were predictors for self-schema content analyses (corresponding to the time-points when these
schema constructs were measured during the study). Mania risk (i.e., Hypomanic Personality Scale)
was entered in Block 3 of the regression equations.
N = 132-136. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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interpersonal domain. In the current study, this result trended towards significance (p = .07).
However, significant bivariate correlations in Study 2 indicated that heightened risk for mania
corresponded with greater endorsement of self-schema cognitive distortions within both the
achievement (r = .29, p = .001) and interpersonal (r = .23, p = .01) domains, consistent with the
results of Study 1. Finally, neither mania risk nor manic symptoms in Study 2 predicted adaptive
beliefs about achievement, as in the previous study.
Role of Mood Symptoms. Depressive symptoms in Study 2 again corresponded with poor
consolidation of positive self-schema content as well as highly consolidated negative self-schema
content. Higher levels of depressive symptoms were also associated with more cognitive distortions
in achievement and interpersonal contexts (see Table 2.2). Likewise, manic symptoms in Study 2 also
corresponded with schema constructs in the expected manner (i.e., greater connectivity regarding
positive self-schema structure and higher levels of cognitive distortions). Similar to Study 1, manic
symptoms often contributed to the prediction of schema constructs in Block 2, and occasionally lost
significance as a predictor, once mania risk was added in Block 3.
Self-Schema Structure and the Prediction of Future Increases in Manic Symptoms
The impetus for a longitudinal component in the current study was to examine temporal
relations between the self-schema constructs (structure and content) and mood symptomatology. As
such, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether positive self-schema
structure, in particular, was predictive of future increases in manic symptoms. Block 1 controlled for
previous manic symptoms, and positive self-schema structure components were entered as predictors
in Block 2 of individual regression equations. Since self-schema structure was initially assessed at
Time 2, Time 2 manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and the three positive PDST scores from
Time 2 were entered in Block 2 of individual regressions predicting Time 3 or Time 4 manic
symptoms. A summary of these analyses is presented in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3
Study 2 Regression Findings for Self-Schema Structure Predicting Future Increases in Manic
Symptoms
Schema
Construct
Overall
Positive
Structure
Positive
Achievement
Structure

Positive
Interpersonal
Structure

Time 3
Block 1
F = 59.78***
R2 = .34
ASRM2 (.59)***

Time 4
Block 2

Block 1

F-change = 2.21
R2 change-= .01

F = 62.71***
R2 = .38

ASRM2 (.52)***
PDST-P (-.12)

ASRM2 (.63)***

Block 2
F-change = 3.51+
R2 change = .02
ASRM2 (.60)***
PDST-P (-0.16)*

F-change = 0.60
R2 change = .00

F-change = 1.56
R2 change = .01

ASRM2 (.57)***
PDST-A (-.06)

ASRM2 (.61)***
PDST-A (-.10)

F-change = 6.90*
R2 change = .03

F-change = 5.70**
R2 change = .04

ASRM2
(0.55)***
PDST-I (-0.18)*

ASRM2 (.59)***
PDST-I (-.20)**

Notes. ASRM2 = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale, Time 2 Symptoms; PDST = Psychological
Distance Scaling Task, PDST-P = Overall Positive Structure, PDST-A = Achievement Structure, PDST-I =
Interpersonal Structure. Time 3 and Time 4 manic symptoms were the dependent variables in
regression equations for Time 2 – Time 3 and Time 2 – Time 4 change in symptoms, respectively.
* = p < .05, **p < .01, *** = p < .001.
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The findings in Table 2.3 indicate that overall positive and positive interpersonal self-schema
structure contributed to the prediction of future manic symptoms in the expected direction.
Specifically, higher connectivity of positive self-beliefs predicted increases in manic symptoms at
both Time 3 and Time 4 for positive interpersonal structure. However, overall positive self-schema
structure only predicted increases in manic symptoms at Time 4, whereas positive achievement
structure was not a significant predictor for either Time 3 or 4. When taken together, these
longitudinal results of Study 2 support the potential role of positive self-schema structure in
contributing to the course of manic symptoms. In turn, this pattern of findings challenges a
methodological concern that any self-schema differences among those at high mania risk may solely
reflect current manic symptomatology.
Mediating Role of Self-Schema Components. The longitudinal component of the current
study also replicates and extends the Study 1 cross-sectional results concerning the mediating role of
self-schema components within maladaptive pathways. In particular, overall positive self-schema
structure in the current study fully mediated the relation between mania risk and future (i.e., Time 4)
manic symptoms. These longitudinal mediation results are displayed in Figure 2.2a. Similar to Study
1, higher HPS scores in Study 2 led to greater connectivity of positive content (measured at Time 2),
which, in turn, led to higher levels of Time 4 manic symptoms. To control for previous levels of
manic symptoms within this model, Time 2 manic symptoms were entered as a covariate (β = .61, p
< .001). Of note, the mediation model was not significant for the prediction of Time 3 manic
symptoms (CI = -.0188 to .0595).
Moreover, cognitive distortions again mediated the relation between mania risk and
depression, but in the current study this was also shown for future depressive symptoms. As
displayed in Figure 2.2b, high mania risk predicted greater cognitive distortions in the interpersonal
domain (measured at Time 3), which, in turn, predicted higher levels of Time 4 depressive symptoms
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Figure 2.2a
Longitudinal Mediation Results for Manic Symptoms

-0.26*

Positive
Structure
Attitudes
Positive

-0.18*

T4 Manic
Symptoms

Mania Risk
0.21* (-0.12)

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effect for Overall Positive Structure was β = .05*. *p < .05
Figure 2.2b
Longitudinal Mediation Results for Depressive Symptoms

0.24***

Mania Risk

Achievement
Cognitive
Distortions

-0.32*

T4 Depressive
Symptoms

0.32*** (0.26*)

0.20*

Interpersonal
Cognitive
Distortions

0.50***

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement Cognitive Distortions,
β = -.08; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .10*; Total indirect effect, β = .02. *p < .05,
***p <.001
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(when controlling for previous levels of depressive symptoms at Time 3, β = .68, p < .001). This
pattern resembled Study 1 findings. However, contrary to the results of Study 1, the indirect effect for
achievement cognitive distortions was not significant within this multiple mediation model (CI = .2044 to .0008). In addition, Study 1 results indicated that cognitive distortions (in both domains)
fully mediated pathways from mania risk to depressive symptoms, whereas the current results were
consistent with a partial mediation effect. Overall, these longitudinal findings provide more robust
support compared to the Study 1 cross-sectional results, concerning the theorized meditational
models advanced in the present dissertation.
Moderating Role of Adaptive Self-Schema Content. In the current study, recall that only
the PBS was included as a measure of adaptive self-schema content. Thus, Study 2 permitted an
examination of the PBS as a potential protective factor concerning future mood symptoms. Similar to
Study 1, the PBS did not significantly moderate between the HPS and manic symptoms, but in this
instance for future manic symptoms measured at Time 4, β = .03, t = 0.69, p = .79. However, in the
present investigation, the PBS (measured at Time 3) was a significant moderator between mania risk
and future depressive symptoms at Time 4, when controlling for previous (Time 3) depressive
symptoms, β = -.19, t = -2.67, p .01 (see Figure 2.3). There was also a significant main effect of the
HPS (β = .13, t = 2.19, p = .03), but not the PBS (β = -.13, t = -1.68, p = .10), in which high levels of
mania risk corresponded with high levels of depressive symptoms. Tests of simple slopes suggest that
high mania risk was only associated with greater depressive symptoms among individuals who also
displayed low adaptive beliefs about success, t = 2.77, p = .007. Thus, this pattern is consistent with
the PBS having a protective role in the course of depressive symptoms among individuals with high
temperamental vulnerability to mania.
Mania Risk and Temporal Stability of Self-Schema Structure
The longitudinal component of Study 2 also permitted examination of the temporal stability
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Figure 2.3
Adaptive Self-Referent Beliefs about Success Moderate the Relation between Mania Risk and
Depressive Symptoms

6

T4 Depressive Symptoms

5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5

Low PBS

3

High PBS

2.5
2
Low HPS

High HPS

Notes. Analysis controlled for the influence of previous depressive symptoms (Time 3). T4 = Time 4;
HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; PBS = Positive Beliefs Statements. **p < .01
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of self-schema structure among individuals at heightened risk for mania. For the total sample, there
were moderate to strong correlations between participants’ Time 2 and Time 3 PDST scores (r = .55
to .90; see Table 2.4), suggesting good overall temporal stability of self-schema structure, as
measured by the PDST. This finding is consistent with previous research that has reported on the
stability of self-schema structure across time (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001a; Dozois, 2007).
To examine whether mania risk may be associated with reduced temporal stability of selfschema structure, difference scores were created for each PDST domain, in which absolute
differences between Time 2 and Time 3 scores were calculated. Subsequently, block regression
analyses were conducted to determine whether mania risk predicted difference scores, while
controlling for participants’ initial PDST scores. Thus, Time 2 PDST scores were entered in the first
block of these regression analyses, and HPS scores were entered in the second block. As shown in
Table 2.4, the HPS significantly predicted difference scores for overall positive structure, as well as
positive and negative achievement structure, suggesting that heightened mania risk is modestly
associated with less stable measurement of self-schema structure in these areas.
Mania Risk as a Predictor of Self-Esteem Stability
Relatedly, another supplementary hypothesis of Study 2 concerns the stability of self-esteem.
Recall that limited research suggests that individuals with a history or risk of mania display more
variable levels of self-esteem compared to control participants (e.g., van der Gucht et al., 2009). The
results of the current study are in line with this finding. In particular, elevated HPS scores predicted
high fluctuations in self-esteem. Block regression results indicated that the HPS positively predicted
variance in participants’ self-esteem ratings across the study period after controlling for initial selfesteem levels (β = .35, p < .001), and even after controlling for a participant’s average levels of
depressive and manic symptoms (β = .28, p = .004). Average levels of manic symptoms (β = .27, p =
.01), but not depressive symptoms (β = .18, p = .18), also positively predicted self-esteem
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Table 2.4
Temporal Reliability of PDST Domains and Relation to Mania Risk

PDST Domain
Overall Positive

Overall Negative

Positive Achievement

Positive Interpersonal

Negative Achievement

Negative Interpersonal

Overall Temporal
Reliability
r = .71**

r = .90**

r = .75**

r = .62**

r = .55**

r = .63**

Predicting Difference Scores from Mania Risk
Block 1

Block 2

F = 3.59
R2 = .03

F-change = 5.88*
R2 change = .05

PDST-P2 (-.18)

HPS (.22)*

F = 2.96
R2 = .04

F-change = 0.01
R2 change = .00

PDST-N2 (.21)

HPS (-.01)

F = 0.08
R2 = .00

F-change = 6.75**
R2 change = .06

PDST-A2 (.04)

HPS (.24)**

F = 11.48**
R2 = .09

F-change = 2.16
R2 change = .02

PDST-I2 (-.30)**

HPS (.13)

F = 7.31**
R2 = .10

F-change = 4.86*
R2 change = .06

PDST-NA2 (.32)**

HPS (.25)*

F = 1.80
R2 = .02

F-change = 0.13
R2 change = .00

PDST-NI2 (.15)

HPS (.04)

Notes. Temporal reliability and difference scores were calculated using PDST results from Time 2
and Time 3. Block 1 controlled for a participant’s initial PDST score (i.e., Time 2) for the
respective structure domain. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, PDST = Psychological Distance
Scaling Task, PDST-A2 = Time 2 Positive Achievement Structure, PDST-I2 = Time 2 Positive
Interpersonal Structure; PDST-N2 = Time 2 Negative Structure; PDST-NA2 = Time 2 Negative
Achievement Structure; PDST-NI2 = Time 2 Negative Interpersonal Structure. *p < .05, **p < .01
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fluctuations; however, neither predictor was significant after the HPS was entered into the block
regression analysis (β = .11, p = .24 and β = .14, p = .33, respectively). Thus, overall, it appears that
heightened risk for mania is associated with self-esteem instability, and this relation is robust
compared to the influence of mood symptoms.
As an aside, higher HPS scores were associated with lower mean levels of self-esteem,
overall (i.e., averaging Time 2 to Time 4 measurements), r = -.20, p = .02. This finding is also
consistent with previous research, in which individuals with bipolar disorder have generally shown
lower levels of self-esteem compared to those with no history of disorder (see Nilsson et al., 2010).
Self-Schema Structure and Self-Esteem Variability. To place the above findings related to
the stability of self-schema organization within the context of self-esteem, Study 2 also examined
how self-schema components assessed at the different time-points may predict momentary levels of
self-esteem. These constructs showed the expected pattern, whereby higher levels of self-esteem at
Time 2 were associated with Time 2 PDST scores representing highly interconnected, positive selfschema content (r =-.46, p < .001) and loosely interconnected, negative self-schema content (r = .55,
p < .001). The same pattern was shown for Time 3 self-esteem levels and Time 3 Overall Positive
(r = -.40, p < .001) and Negative (r = .63, p < .001) PDST scores. These findings reinforce
assumptions that self-schema organization of positive and negative content bears upon one’s
momentary feelings of self-liking.
Life Events and Mania
A central research question addressed by this dissertation is whether self-schema components
interact with life events to predict the course of mood symptoms. Recall that previous research
implicates certain positive life events in the course of manic symptoms, particularly goal attainment
and BAS-activating events (e.g., Johnson, 2008; Urošević et al., 2008). As summarized in Appendix
F, in the present sample, simple correlations showed many of the expected, positive relationships
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between positive life events (Positive, BAS-Activating, Goal Attainment) and concurrent or future
manic symptoms. Conversely, the same relationships were not demonstrated among negative life
events and manic symptoms. Instead, consistent with the literature, negative life events (Negative and
BAS-Deactivating) shared positive relationships with concurrent/ future depressive symptoms (see
Appendix G).
Manic Symptoms: Testing for Interactions with Positive Self-Schema Structure by Life Events
To comprehensively evaluate a vulnerability-stress model of mania, Study 2 examined
whether self-schema components interacted with life events and mania risk to predict the course of
manic symptoms. Recall that it was hypothesized that individuals with certain self-schema
characteristics (e.g., tightly organized positive content) would show high prevalence of manic
symptoms, when activated by positive life events and at higher levels of mania risk (indexed by the
HPS).
To test these predictions, sets of three-way interaction effects were examined in the present
study. Recall that life events were measured at both Time 2 and Time 4, with each time-point probing
for events occurring over the prior four weeks. Thus, it was possible to examine: (i) the relation
between life events (reported at Time 2) and concurrent manic symptoms (assessed at Time 2), and
(ii) change in manic symptoms (between Time 2 and Time 4) as a function of the various life events
(reported at Time 4). For concurrent mood symptoms, individual predictors were entered in Block 1,
two-way interaction terms were entered in Block 2, and the three-way interaction was entered in
Block 3 of the regression analyses. For predicting change in manic symptoms over time, Time 2
manic symptoms were entered in Block 1, individual predictors were entered in Block 2, and twoway and three-way interaction terms were entered in Blocks 3 and 4, respectively. For all analyses,
Overall Positive PDST scores from Time 2 (when first assessed) were utilized as predictors for selfschema structure. All predictors were centered prior to conducting the above analyses.
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Concurrent Symptoms. As summarized in Table 2.5, there were no significant three-way or
two-way interactions for Time 2 life events predicting concurrent (Time 2) manic symptoms.
However, there were significant main effects of the HPS, self-schema structure, and positive and goal
attainment events, whereby greater mania risk, highly interconnected positive self-schema content,
and greater life events corresponded with higher levels of manic symptoms reported at Time 2.
Prospective Increases in Manic Symptoms. For life events reported at Time 4 predicting
change in manic symptoms between Time 2 and 4, there were no significant three-way interactions
for any of the life events studied. However, there were two significant interaction effects associated
with positive and goal attainment events, concerning the relation between these life events and
positive self-schema structure (see Table 2.6 for details). Similar to the above results for concurrent
manic symptoms, there were also main effects of life events and positive self-schema structure.
Tests of simple slopes were conducted to examine the nature of the significant two-way
interaction effects. As displayed in Figure 2.4a and 2.4b, for both positive and goal events, slopes
representing high interconnectivity of positive self-schema content significantly differed from zero,
whereas slopes corresponding with low interconnectivity did not. Consistent with what was
hypothesized, these results suggest that greater positive and goal attainment events were associated
with increases in manic symptoms over time, but only among individuals with tightly organized,
positive self-schema content.
Specific Domains of Self-Schema Structure. Follow-up analyses were conducted in light of
these significant moderation results to examine more specific domains of positive self-schema
content. As such, the above analyses for positive and goal attainment events were repeated for
positive content parsed in the achievement and interpersonal domains. Results of these analyses
indicated that positive achievement self-schema structure significantly interacted with both positive
(β = -.18, p = .04) and goal events (β = -.19, p = .03). Conversely, the interaction terms for
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Table 2.5
Moderation Results for Concurrent Manic Symptoms (Time 2): Positive Self-Schema Structure x Positive Life
Events
Predictor
Positive Events
Block 1:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T2 LES-P
Block 2:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T2 LES-P
T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-P
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-P
BAS-Activating Events
Block 1:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T2 LES-B
Block 2:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T2 LES-B
T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-B
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-B
Goal Attainment Events
Block 1:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T2 LES-G
Block 2:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T2 LES-G
T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-G
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-G

ΔF

ΔR2

6.64***

.44

0.78

1.41

β

.26**
-.19*
.19*

(.24)**
(-.22)*
(.18)*

.08
-.14
.01

(.08)
(-.14)
(.02)

.02

.03
-.01

6.24**

0.67

0.03

.13

0.58

0.01

R2 = .39, F(7, 124) = 3.14**

.25**
-.20*
-.01

(.26)**
(-.25)*
(.07)

.11
-.12
.03

(.11)
(-.11)
(.06)

.01

.00
-.03

6.78**

Final Model

.14

R2 = .14, F(7, 124) = 2.92**

.25**
-.18*
.18*

(-.21)*
(.23)**
(.18)*

.08
-.09
.03

(.11)
(-.11)
(.06)

.01

.00
.01

R2 = .15, F(7, 124) = 3.10**

Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale;
T2 = Time 2; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale;
LES-P = Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Events. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p
< .001
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Table 2.6
Moderation Results for Time 2- Time 4 Change in Manic Symptoms: Positive Self-Schema Structure x Positive
Life Events
Predictor
Positive Events
Block 1:
T2 ASRM
Block 2:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T4 LES-P
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T4 LES-P
T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P
Block 4:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P
BAS-Activating Events
Block 1:
T2 ASRM
Block 2:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T4 LES-B
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T4 LES-B
T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-B
Block 4:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P
Goal Attainment Events
Block 1:
T2 ASRM
Block 2:
HPS
T2 PDST-P
T4 LES-G
Block 3:
HPS x T2 PDST-P
HPS x T4 LES-G
T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-G
Block 4:
HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-G

ΔF

ΔR2

64.15***

.40

3.29*

.06

1.58

0.20

β

.63***

(.55)***

.09
-.17*
.19*

(.04)
(-.27)*
(.23)*

-.06
.03
-.16*

(-.08)
(.06)
(-.22)*

.03

.00
.05

64.15***

.40

1.58

.03

0.05

0.10

(.57)***

.04
-.15
-.05

(.05)
(-.15)
(-.05)

-.01
-.04
-.07

(-.01)
(-.30)*
(0.21)+

.00

.00

64.15***

.39

3.14*

.06

1.04

R2 = .49, F(8, 117) = 10.53***

.67***

.06

2.06

Final Model

R2 = .43, F(8, 117) = 8.44***

.63***

(.56)***

.09
-.16*
.18*

(.08)
(-.32)*
(.22)*

.04
-.08
-.30*

(.11)
(-.11)
(-.30)*

.04

.01
.13

R2 = .49, F(8, 117) = 10.96***

Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania
Scale; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale; LES-P =
Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Events. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Figure 2.4a
Positive Self-Schema Structure Interacts with Positive Events to Predict Increases in Manic
Symptoms
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Figure 2.4b
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interpersonal structure were not significant for positive (β = -.13, p = .11) or goal events (β = -.15, p
= .06). The results of simple slope tests and interpretation of the significant interaction effects for
positive achievement structure were consistent with the above results for overall positive structure.
Taken together, moderation results pertaining to positive self-schema structure suggest that
increases in manic symptoms may be associated with positive events (i.e., general positive and goal
attainment) when positive self-schema content is also highly interconnected. Within analyses of
three-way interactions, mania risk as indexed by the HPS did not have a clear moderating role
regarding the impact of positive events in the course of manic symptoms. One possibility is that there
was not adequate power in this study to comprehensively examine the potential impact of mania risk
within the context of life events and self-schema structure, since fewer than expected ‘high HPS’
participants were retained in the longitudinal sample. Another consideration is that there may be
considerable competition or overlap between the role of the HPS and positive self-schema structure
as predictors regarding the trajectory of manic symptoms.
Moreover, it is also unclear why there was a discrepancy between concurrent versus
prospective manic symptoms in the above moderation results, whereby significant two-way
interactions between life events and positive self-schema structure were only found for prospective
increases in manic symptoms. One possibility is that examining the relation between life events and
change in manic symptoms over time served as a more rigorous examination of these constructs,
which may have resulted in greater precision and statistical power.
Summary of Major Findings
Study 2 replicated and extended major findings from Study 1 concerning aspects of selfschema structure and content associated with mania. In the present study, positive self-schema
structure again shared important relations with mania constructs. Longitudinal results also provided
preliminary support for self-schema structure as an enduring vulnerability factor associated with
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mania. Specifically, high connectivity of positive self-schema content predicted increases in manic
symptoms over time. Regarding self-schema content, cognitive distortions in interpersonal/
achievement domains and adaptive beliefs about achievement also appeared relevant to the cognitive
profile of mania, specifically in relation to depressive symptoms.
Notably, the longitudinal component of Study 2 permitted examination of the stability of selfschema characteristics over time. Greater mania risk was associated with less stable organization of
overall positive content, as well as positive and negative content within the achievement domain,
despite evidence that self-schema structure was a relatively stable characteristic within the current
sample. Relatedly, high mania risk also corresponded with fluctuations in self-esteem over time,
whereby self-schema structure was a strong predictor of momentary levels of self-esteem.
Study 2 also provided an initial examination of the role of self-schema structure within a
cognitive vulnerability-stress framework of mania, by considering the interaction between life events
and the organization of positive self-schema content. These results indicated that self-schema
structure moderated the relation between life events and change in manic symptoms over time, such
that positive and goal events were associated with increases in manic symptoms among individuals
with tightly organized, positive self-schema content. A role of positive achievement structure, in
particular, was implicated in interactions with life events.
Although it was anticipated that interactions between positive life events and self-schema
constructs would only be observed at high levels of mania risk, this was not found in the current
investigation. That is, three-way moderation results were not significant, suggesting that the HPS did
not play a role in the interactions between life events and positive self-schema structure. Of note, the
current sample was considerably smaller compared to Study 1, and sample attrition between Time 1
and future study sessions resulted in fewer than expected ‘high HPS’ individuals participating in
Study 2. Thus, it would be important to further examine relations between life events and schema
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components within a larger sample, to assess whether a lack of significant three-way interactions
involving mania risk may be attributed, at least in part, to low statistical power in the current study.
In addition, the current study only included measures of self-schema content (i.e., CDS and
PBS) that appear particularly relevant for the course of depressive symptoms, rather than manic
symptoms within the context of mania risk. Thus, interactions between life events and self-schema
content were not assessed in Study 2. As such, Study 3 will examine interactions between life events
and self-schema content measures that have been used previously in Study 1 (i.e., dysfunctional
attitudes about achievement and obsessive passion) that were hypothesized to be more important for
the course of manic symptoms.
Finally, the first two studies of this dissertation were conducted with samples drawn from the
same population (i.e., an online, community sample). Thus, it would be important to examine
relations between mania and self-schema components within an entirely different, non-clinical
sample, in order to further assess whether the previous findings may be characteristic of a nonclinical investigation of mania risk.
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Chapter 4
Study 3: Replication of Main Findings with a University Student Sample
The third and final study in this dissertation focuses primarily on the sixth research question
by examining whether the main findings demonstrated in the first two studies replicate when
extended to a different, nonclinical sample. In doing so, the previously described set of research
questions were examined in a university student sample to provide a further test of the empirical
associations among mania risk, self-schema components, life events, and mood symptomatology. In
this Study 3 examination of the constructs and hypotheses tested in the prior two studies, it was not
expected that there would be marked differences between the main findings obtained for the previous
two community samples, when compared with the current university sample.
Hypotheses. The hypotheses put forth in Study 3 derived from those advanced in Studies 1
and 2. Specifically, it was anticipated that self-schema content and self-schema structure would both
predict temperamental vulnerability to mania, after controlling for the influence of mood symptoms.
Once again, tightly organized, positive self-schema content was expected to correspond with mania
risk. However, in light of the findings obtained in Studies 1 and 2, it was not expected that this
pattern of findings for positive self-schema structure would be restricted to content within the
achievement domain. It was also predicted in Study 3 that the additional self-schema content
examined in Study 1 (i.e., dysfunctional attitudes about achievement and obsessive passion) would
once again be positively associated with mania risk in this current study. Moreover, it was again
expected that self-schema constructs in Study 3 would play a significant role in the relations between
mania risk and mood symptoms. In particular, it was anticipated that self-schema components would
function as significant mediators in certain maladaptive pathways. In Study 3 these include positive
self-schema structure, along with self-schema content of dysfunctional attitudes and obsessive
passion, as significant mediators of manic symptoms. Consistent with earlier hypotheses, it was also
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predicted that a putative protective factor, namely, harmonious passion, may moderate (rather than
mediate) the relation between mania risk and manic symptoms within the present investigation.
In Study 3, it was again posited that significant three-way interactions would be found
concerning self-schema constructs, positive life events, and mania risk, when predicting manic
symptoms. Despite some Study 2 evidence that does not support a role for the hypomanic personality
(HPS) in these three-way interactions, it is suggested here that these Study 2 null findings may
primarily relate to limited statistical power. This proposal is generally supported by other findings in
Studies 1 and 2 that show a positive association between the HPS and manic symptoms.
Furthermore, the results of Study 2 implicate self-schema structure, in particular, interacting
with life events. As such, it was predicted that positive self-schema structure in Study 3 would again
interact with positive life events to predict manic symptoms, with this pattern particularly noticeable
among those at high risk for mania. In addition, Study 3 examines self-schema content (i.e., DAS and
Obsessive Passion) that is hypothesized to interact with mania risk and positive life events to predict
manic symptoms. However, recall here that a general hypothesis of this dissertation was that selfschema structure may be more relevant to a cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania, compared
to self-schema content.
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Method Study 3
Participants
Participants were students enrolled in an introductory Psychology course at The University of
1

Western Ontario, who completed this study in exchange for course credit . Five hundred and fiftythree students signed up for the study, however results from 22 participants were excluded from
analyses due to incorrect answers to careful responding questions (i.e., two or more incorrect
responses to seven questions). Thus, 531 students (386 females, 145 males) comprised the final
sample for the current study. The vast majority of participants were aged 18 to 24 years (98%), with
only 2% of participants aged 25 to 44 years. Regarding ethnicity, 48% of participants identified as
White, 40% as Asian, and 12% as another ethnicity. In terms of the mental health history of
participants, 11% of individuals reported a past diagnosis of mental disorder, with 4% endorsing
more than one diagnosis and 9% reporting a current diagnosis. A family history of bipolar-related
disorder was also reported by 6% of participants.
Materials
A list of the materials used in the current study is presented in Table 3.1. All of the measures
employed in Study 3 were used in Study 1 and/or 2, and have been described in more detail in
previous chapters of this dissertation.
Mania Risk. The HPS (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) was again used in the present study as a
continuous measure of temperamental risk for mania. For further details of this measure, please see
Chapter 2 (Study 1).
Mood Disorder Symptoms. The ASRM and DASS were also used in Study 3 to measure

1

This study was originally planned as a longitudinal investigation, similar to Study 2, to promote statistical power.
However, the study design was modified such that only a cross-sectional examination was completed, due to significant
attrition at the second time-point of the study occurring 3 weeks later (total n = 33 at Time 2).
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Table 3.1
Summary of Study 3 Materials
Study Measure
Hypomanic Personality Scale
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale
DASS-21 – Depression subscale
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory
Psychological Distance Scaling Task
Life Events Survey
Mood Induction Procedure
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale
Passion Scale
Note. DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21.
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recent manic and depressive symptoms, respectively. Detailed information regarding these measures
is also presented in Chapter 2.
Life Events. As in Study 2, the expanded version of the LES was employed to examine
various life events experienced by participants. In the present study, participants were asked to
consider whether any of the specified life events had occurred over the previous 3 weeks. A detailed
description of the LES is provided in Chapter 3 (Study 2).
Mood Induction Procedure. The same positive MIP utilized in Study 1 and 2 was employed
in the current study to promote the potential activation of self-schema content relevant to mania. This
was implemented prior to understanding the impact of the MIP on the study of schema
characteristics. For details, see Chapter 2 (Study 1) and Appendix B.
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson,
2001b). The PDST was similarly employed as a measure of self-schema structure in the present
study. See Chapter 2 (Study 1) for a detailed description of this task.
Self-Schema Content. The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale and Passion Scale were again
administered in the current study to examine aspects of self-schema content. Details regarding each
of these measures can be found in Chapter 2 (Study 1).
Procedure
Ethics approval was obtained prior to participant recruitment (see Appendix H). Once they
had viewed the advertisement, students could sign-up for the study and complete the study session
online. After being directed to the study website and consenting to participate in the study,
individuals were randomly presented with the mood symptom, mania risk, self-esteem, schema
structure, and life event measures. Following the mood induction procedure, all participants
completed the DAS and Passion Scale in that order, in light of previously explained considerations
(see Chapter 2).
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Study 3 – Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics (sample size, means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas) for the
study measures are displayed in Appendix I.
Replication Results for Relations between Mania and Schema Constructs
In the current Study 3 university student sample, the major findings from Studies 1 and 2
were replicated concerning relations between mania and self-schema constructs (see Table 3.2).
Similar hierarchical regression analyses were again conducted in Study 3 to determine the
contribution of mania risk to self-schema constructs, controlling for recent manic and depressive
symptoms. As in Studies 1 and 2, heightened mania risk in Study 3 corresponded with tightly
organized, positive self-schema content. However, contrary to the results of the two prior studies,
only manic symptoms (and not mania risk) significantly predicted high connectivity of positive
content within the achievement domain. Moreover, consistent with Study 1, but not Study 2, greater
mania risk predicted high connectivity of positive self-schema content within the interpersonal
domain in the current investigation (see Table 3.2).
In addition, mania risk did not contribute to the prediction of negative self-schema content
within Study 3 block regression analyses, similar to Studies 1 and 2. However, of note, bivariate
correlations indicate that mania risk showed a weak association with negative interpersonal structure,
r = -.10, p = .04. Although a similar correlational result was observed in Study 2 whereby mania risk
corresponded with high connectivity of negative self-schema content, recall that this was shown for
negative achievement (rather than interpersonal) structure.
Moreover, Study 3 also replicated results regarding the contribution of mania risk to the
prediction of self-schema content. Specifically, higher mania risk was again associated in the present
study with greater endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment and higher levels of
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Table 3.2
Study 3 Replication of Regression Results for Self-Schema Constructs of Structure and Content in a
University Student Sample
Self-Schema
Construct

Block 2
Change

Block 3
Change

Overall Positive F = 165.63***
Structure
R2 = .24

F-change = 8.91**
R2 change = .02

F-change = 5.78*
R2 change = .01

F = 61.49***
R2 = .26
Depression (.48)***
Mania (-.08)*
Mania Risk (-.10)*

Positive
Achievement
Structure

F = 142.08***
R2 = .21

F-change = 5.76*
R2 change = .01

F-change = 2.22
R2 change = .01

F = 50.55***
R2 = .22
Depression (.44)***
Mania (-.07)*
Mania Risk (-.06)

Positive
Interpersonal
Structure

F = 104.76**
R2 = .16

F-change = 8.36**
R2 change = .02

F-change =
7.92**
R2 change = .01

F = 41.30***
R2 = .19
Depression (.38)***
Mania (-.08)*
Mania Risk (-.12)**

Overall
Negative
Structure

F = 98.31***
R2 = .19

F-change = 1.83
R2 change = .00

F-change = 2.19
R2 change = .00

F = 34.27***
R2 = .19
Depression (-.44)***
Mania (-.04)
Mania Risk (-.07)

Negative
Achievement
Structure

F = 108.12***
R2 = .20

F-change = 1.54
R2 change = .00

F-change = 1.05
R2 change = .00

F = 36.95***
R2 = .19
Depression (-.45)***
Mania (-.04)
Mania Risk (-.05)

Negative
Interpersonal
Structure

F = 71.39***
R2 = .13

F-change = 3.16
R2 change = .01

F-change = 2.39
R2 change = .00

F = 25.82***
R2 = .14
Depression (-.37)***
Mania (-.06)
Mania Risk (-.07)

Block 1
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Overall Model and
Predictors

Dysfunctional
Attitudes –
Goal
Attainment
Content

F = 0.45
R2 = .00

F-change =
10.63***
R2 change = .02

F-change =
7.12**
R2 change = .02

F = 10.55**
R2 = .04
Depression (-.03)
Mania (.10)*
Mania Risk (.14)**

Obsessive
F = 11.42**
Passion Content R2 = .02

F-change =
25.56***
R2 change = .05

F-change =
23.48***
R2 change = .04

F = 20.86**
R2 = .11
Depression (.15)**
Mania (.13)**
Mania Risk (.22)***

Harmonious
F = 11.28**
Passion Content R2 = .02

F-change = 5.54*
R2 change = .01

F-change = 2.67
R2 change = .00

F = 6.55***
R2 = .04
Depression (-.12)**
Mania (.08)
Mania Risk (.07)

Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.
Depressive and manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and 2, respectively. Mania risk (i.e.,
Hypomanic Personality Scale) was entered in Block 3 of the regression equations.
N = 531. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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obsessive passion. Consistent with earlier results of this dissertation, mania risk was not a significant
predictor of harmonious passion.
Within the block regressions analyses of Study 3 (see Table 3.2), depressive symptoms again
showed expected patterns. Notably, depression was not associated in the Study 3 sample with
dysfunctional attitudes about achievement, similar to the Study 1 sample. In addition, manic
symptoms in Study 3 often added to the prediction of self-schema components, showing the same
patterns of findings as mania risk. Overall, these results for Study 3 are generally consistent with the
regression findings from Studies 1 and 2.
Self-Schema Constructs Mediate between Mania Risk and Symptoms in a University Sample
In Study 3 it was demonstrated that self-schema components once again helped to explain
relations between important mania-relevant constructs, but in this instance, for a university student
sample. These findings are shown in Figure 3.1 below. Specifically, the current findings indicate that
positive self-schema structure and obsessive passion significantly mediated the relation between
mania risk and manic symptoms. Of note is that consistent across all three studies in this dissertation,
greater mania risk corresponded with tighter organization of positive self-schema content (i.e., less
interstimulus distance), which, in turn, predicted higher levels of manic symptoms.
The mediating effect for obsessive passion in the current study was also very similar to that
reported previously in Study 1, as higher HPS scores were once again associated with greater
obsessive passion, which predicted higher levels of manic symptoms (see Figure 3.1). Furthermore,
similar to Study 1 findings, there was not a significant indirect effect for dysfunctional attitudes about
goal attainment within this multiple mediation model that included self-schema structure and other
types of self-schema content (see Figure 3.1).
Replication Results for the Moderating Role of Harmonious Passion for Manic Symptoms
The current study permitted further examination of harmonious passion as a protective
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Figure 3.1. Replication of Mediation Results for Manic Symptoms

Dysfunctional
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0.09*

0.06
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Obsessive
Passion
Positive

0.11*

Mania Risk

Mania Symptoms
0.33*** (0.27***)

-0.10*

Positive
Structure
Positive

-0.21***

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional Attitudes, β = .01;
Obsessive Passion, β = .03*; Overall Positive Structure, β = .02*; Total indirect effect, β = .05*.
*p < .05, ***p < .001.
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attribute within the context of mania. Similar to Study 1, it was examined whether harmonious
passion was adaptive as a moderator of mania risk, with high levels of harmonious passion
corresponding with attenuated manic symptoms. Moderation analysis in Study 3 indicated that
harmonious passion did not significantly interact with mania risk to predict manic symptoms within
the university student sample, β = .02, t = 0.56, p = .57. This is consistent with the non-significant
result found in Study 1; although recall that in Study 1 there was a trend (p = .08) in line with the
hypothesis that harmonious passion moderated between mania risk and symptoms.
Manic Symptoms: Testing Interactions between Mania Risk, Life Events and Self-Schema
Constructs
To further investigate a cognitive vulnerability-stress hypothesis, potential three-way
interactions among mania risk, self-schema constructs, and life events in predicting recent manic
symptoms were also examined within the university student sample of Study 3. A multiple regression
approach similar to that used in the previous two studies was once again employed with the Study 3
sample, using centered values of predictors. A summary of the details of these moderation analyses is
presented in Table 3.3.
Self-Schema Structure. Consistent with hypotheses, significant three-way interactions were
found for general positive and BAS-Activating events. Of note, for the remaining analysis involving
goal attainment events, there was a non-significant trend (p = .08) that resembled the result for
general positive events.
The interaction effect for Positive events is depicted in Figure 3.2. Corresponding regression
results indicated there were main effects of the HPS and PDST, suggesting that high mania risk and
greater connectivity of positive self-schema content was associated with higher levels of manic
symptoms. None of the two-way interaction terms were significant within the context of the
significant three-way interaction.
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Table 3.3.
Schema Structure: Three-Way Interaction Results Predicting Manic Symptoms.
Predictor
Positive Events
Block 1:
T1 HPS
T2 LES-P
T2 PDST-P
Block 2:
HPS x LES-P
LES-P x PDST-P
HPS x PDST-P
Block 3:
HPS x T2 LES-P x T2 PDST-P

ΔF

ΔR2

32.01***

.15

0.36

3.72*

β

Final Model

.29***
.10***
-.20***

(.29)***
(.07)+
(-.18)***

-.02
-.04
-.01

(-.03)
(-.04)
(-.01)

-.10*

(-.10)*

.00

.01
R2 = .16, F(7, 533) = 14.42***

BAS-Activating Events
Block 1:
T1 HPS
T2 LES-B
T2 PDST-P
Block 2:
HPS x LES-B
LES-B x PDST-P
HPS x PDST-P
Block 3:
HPS x T2 LES-B x T2 PDST-P

31.00***

1.16

6.62**

.15
.31***
-.06
-.20***

(.33)***
(-.06)
(-.17)***

-.04
-.07
-.01

(-.03)
(-.09)*
(-.00)

-.11**

(-.11)**

.00

.01
R2 = .15, F(7, 533) = 14.89***

Goal Attainment Events
Block 1:
T1 HPS
T2 LES-G
T2 PDST-P
Block 2:
HPS x LES-G
LES-G x PDST-P
HPS x PDST-P
Block 3:
HPS x T2 LES-G x T2 PDST-P

32.67***

0.04

2.58+

.15
.29***
.10**
-.19***

(.33)***
(-.06)
(-.17)***

.00
-.01
-.01

(-.01)
(-.01)
(-.01)

-.08+

(-.08)+

.00

.005

R2 = .15, F(7, 533) = 14.34***
Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania
Scale; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale;
LES-P = Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Attainment Events.
+p < .10, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Figure 3.2
Three-Way Interaction between Positive Schema Structure, Positive Events, and Mania Risk
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constructs (± 1 standard deviation). **p < .01
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As shown in Figure 3.2, only the slope reflecting high HPS scores and high connectivity of
positive self-schema content was significantly different from zero (t = 2.48, p = .01), indicating that
these individuals showed greater manic symptoms when they experienced more positive life events
compared to fewer positive life events. Such an effect was not observed at other levels of the HPS
and self-schema structure. Similarly, tests of slope differences also indicated that this slope
corresponding with high HPS scores and high self-schema connectivity was significantly different
from the slope corresponding with high HPS levels and low self-schema connectivity (t = -1.94, p =
.04). Overall, these Study 3 findings suggest that positive life events were associated with higher
levels of manic symptoms within the current student sample, specifically among those who displayed
high temperamental risk for mania as well as tightly organized, positive self-schema content.
Moderation results associated with BAS-Activating events showed a slightly different pattern
of results (see Table 3.3). As depicted in Figure 3.3, the slope representing high mania risk and high
connectivity of positive self-schema content was the only slope that was positively graded, but this
slope was not statistically different from zero (t = 1.10, p = .25). Thus, this result does not
definitively suggest that higher levels of BAS-Activating events were associated with greater manic
symptoms among individuals at high mania risk. Conversely, it was the slope representing high HPS
levels and low connectivity of positive content that significantly differed from zero (t = -3.49, p =
.002), indicating that greater BAS-Activating events were actually associated with fewer manic
symptoms among these individuals. Nevertheless, these two slopes corresponding with high mania
risk significantly differed from each other (t = 3.10, p = .002), indicating that BAS-Activating events
had a dissimilar role when individuals with high HPS scores also showed high connectivity of
positive self-schema content.
Specific Domains of Self-Schema Structure. Follow-up analyses were also conducted in
Study 3 to explore content domains of self-schema structure that may be involved in the above
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Figure 3.3.
Three-Way Interaction between Positive Schema Structure, BAS-Activating Events, and Mania Risk
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significant interactions. For general positive events, the three-way interaction for positive
interpersonal structure was significant (β = -.10, t = -2.02, p = .04), whereas the interaction associated
with achievement structure was non-significant (β = -.08, t = -1.86, p = .07). Alternatively, both
positive achievement (β = -.10, t = -2.17, p = .03) and interpersonal structure (β = -.12, t = -2.81, p =
.01) moderated the effect of BAS-activating events on manic symptoms, in conjunction with mania
risk. The interpretation of these significant interactions was identical to that for overall positive selfschema structure, described previously.
The above findings for Study 3 are generally consistent with the moderation results from
Study 2. Important differences include how significant two-way interaction effects included positive
and goal attainment events in the previous study, whereas three-way interaction results for goal
events only approached significance in the present study. Moreover, BAS-Activating events were not
implicated within significant interactions involving life events in Study 2. In the present study, BAS
events were associated with several moderating effects that showed a somewhat different pattern of
results compared to the other events studied in this dissertation. Specifically, it did not appear that
BAS-Activating events had the same sensitization effect as positive and goal events in the current
and/or previous study, where greater BAS-Activating events corresponded with higher levels of
manic symptoms.
Furthermore, there were no significant three-way interactions found in Study 2 that supported
a moderating role of the HPS, whereas the present results of Study 3 indicate that individuals
showing greater risk for mania reported greater manic symptoms at differing levels of positive selfschema structure and life events. In this regard, one notable difference between the two studies was
the number of observations available (i.e., n =139 in Study 2 and n=531 in Study 3) for the above
analyses involving life events. This likely resulted in greater statistical power in the present study,
which could help to explain the additional presence of significant, three-way interaction effects.
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Moreover, another difference between the two studies was that there appeared to be a more
prominent role for positive achievement self-schema structure within Study 2 interactions involving
life events, whereas both achievement and interpersonal domains were implicated in the present
study.
Schema Content. Study 3 also examined self-schema content that was not explored in Study
2 (i.e., the DAS and Obsessive Passion), regarding potential interactions with life events and mania
risk. However, no significant three-way or two-way interaction effects involving life events were
found for dysfunctional attitudes about achievement or obsessive passion in Study 3, despite main
effects of the individual predictors in the expected directions. Specifically, greater mania risk (i.e.,
HPS), positive events (i.e., positive and goal attainment), and maladaptive self-schema content (i.e.,
DAS and Obsessive Passion) corresponded with higher levels of manic symptoms. A full summary of
these moderation results for Study 3 can be found in Appendix J.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
The present dissertation addressed several research questions associated with the preliminary
examination of a novel, cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania. In particular, the three studies
in this dissertation focused on self-schema constructs that have yet to be examined in relation to
mania. These self-schema constructs span both cognitive structure (i.e., degree of interconnection)
and content (i.e., cognitive distortions in different domains, adaptive self-referent beliefs about
success, and obsessive passion).
This dissertation project considered the relation between self-schema components and mania
constructs, as well as the predictive utility of self-schema constructs for the course of mood
symptoms. The current investigation also addressed whether mood induction procedures (MIP) may
be required to facilitate the empirical examination of any self-schema content relevant to mania.
A central aspect of this dissertation was the assessment of whether self-schema components
may play an important role in a vulnerability-stress model of manic symptoms. This was done by
considering possible interactions among self-schema components and various life events. As this
dissertation provided an initial examination of a cognitive vulnerability model that centralized the
role of self-schema structure, the research question of whether major findings could be replicated
within different non-clinical samples was also considered. Overall, this initial work is intended to
help inform future clinical research and theory in this domain. The major findings across the three
studies of this dissertation are discussed below. In doing so, limitations and extensions of the current
research are also considered.
Mania and Self-Schema Constructs of Content and Structure
A central objective of this dissertation was to identify self-schema characteristics that
correspond with mania, and in particular, appear distinctly related to vulnerability to mania rather
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than depression. As such, the present research extended the literature by examining several novel
types of self-schema content in relation to mania. Importantly, this examination also considered the
relevance of each type of content for mania versus depressive symptoms.
Self-Schema Content Findings. To begin, it was first found that mania risk was associated
with high levels of dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment, which have been previously linked
to bipolar disorder (Lam et al., 2004). Recall that these attitudes pertain to unrealistic goals about
success (e.g., “A person should do well at everything he or she undertakes”) and positive mood states
(e.g., “I should be happy all the time”). Across Studies 1 and 3, the present findings supported the
notion that these attitudes appear particularly relevant to mania, as they also showed no significant
associations with depressive symptoms. However, within the mediation model tested in the current
research, these attitudes did not significantly mediate between the hypomanic personality and manic
symptoms. Thus, it is possible that these attitudes may have a less distinctive role within the course
of manic symptoms, in comparison to self-schema structure and other types of self-schema content.
In the present dissertation, obsessive passion was a newly studied construct (Vallerand et al.,
2003) in relation to mania. The present findings suggest that this construct is particularly relevant for
the course of manic versus depressive symptoms. It was initially hypothesized that this individual
difference characteristic would pertain to the content of the manic self-schema, since it captures
relentless pursuit of a valued activity at the expense of other values and life activities (e.g., “I have
the impression that this activity controls me”; “I have difficulties controlling the urge to do my
activity”; Vallerand et al., 2003). As such, obsessive passion relates to maladaptive patterns of
activation and goal pursuit. Recall that goal dysregulation has been implicated in bipolar disorder
(Johnson, 2005), where success has been associated with higher levels of activation and goal pursuit,
rather than the short-term reduction in effort towards future goals that is seen amongst the general
population (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). Importantly, results of both Studies 1 and 3
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in the present dissertation indicate that obsessive passion was not only associated with mania
constructs, but it also served as a significant mediator between the hypomanic personality and manic
symptoms within a model that also accounted for other types of self-schema content and self-schema
structure. Conversely, obsessive passion showed minimal associations with depressive symptoms,
particularly in comparison to mania constructs (see Study 1 and Study 3). Accordingly, this is the
first known investigation to identify obsessive passion as an individual difference characteristic that
is highly relevant to mania in comparison to depression.
When considering self-schema content, a number of previous investigations have linked
bipolar disorder to perfectionistic attitudes (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Corry et al., 2017). The results of
the present dissertation continued to build on this prior work. Specifically, Study 1 of this dissertation
showed that the mania constructs of risk and symptoms were both associated with self-oriented and
other-oriented perfectionism, whereas the same patterns were not shown for recent depressive
symptoms. This is somewhat inconsistent with previous research linking self-oriented perfectionism
with chronic depressive symptoms (e.g., Corry et al., 2017). However, since Study 1 only assessed
recent depressive symptoms, this could likely help to explain the discrepancy between the present
results and this existing finding in the literature.
Moreover, in the present thesis it was found that mania risk also predicted high levels of
socially-prescribed perfectionism, even after accounting for the influence of recent mood symptoms.
This pattern of results in Study 1 suggests that socially-prescribed perfectionism may be a more
enduring vulnerability characteristic associated with mania. In addition, socially-prescribed
perfectionism also played a role within the multiple mediation model of manic symptoms tested in
Study 1. These results are consistent with limited prior work indicating that chronic manic symptoms
are associated with high levels of socially-prescribed perfectionism, of all the different dimensions of
perfectionism (Corry et al., 2017; Hewitt et al., 1998). The present research extends these findings by
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documenting an association between socially-prescribed perfectionism and mania risk within a nonclinical sample. Recall that this aspect of perfectionism addresses perfectionistic behaviour that is
attributed to the motives and expectations of others (Hewitt & Flett, 1990). As such, sociallyprescribed perfectionism incorporates a strong social evaluative component.
The above findings concerning socially-prescribed perfectionism may fit well with existing
theory and research on goal dysregulation in bipolar disorder (Johnson, 2005). Recall that a pattern of
extremely optimistic life ambitions has been noted among individuals with bipolar disorder and high
mania risk, in which extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivations appear dominant (e.g., success, fame)
(Gruber & Johnson, 2009; Johnson, Eisner, & Carver, 2009). In turn, these extrinsic motivations may
relate to the importance of social evaluation regarding one’s goals. Thus, there may be an
interpersonal component to maladaptive beliefs about achievement that have been implicated in
vulnerability to mania (e.g., Lam et al., 2004). In particular, individuals may strongly base selfjudgments about success in relation to their ability to exceed perceived high standards from the
perspective of others.
The present findings also showed that high levels of cognitive distortions appear to
characterize the manic self-schema. Here, it was initially hypothesized that cognitive distortions in
the achievement domain would be the most closely associated with mania constructs. Instead, the
findings of Study 1 and 2 indicate that cognitive content distortions in both the achievement and
interpersonal domains were significantly associated with the hypomanic personality and manic
symptoms. However, it was only in Study 1 that mania risk added to the prediction of interpersonal
cognitive distortions, beyond the contributions of manic and depressive symptoms. This latter finding
was not replicated in Study 2. Instead, strong associations were found between cognitive distortions
and depressive symptoms across Studies 1 and 2.
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Taken together, the above findings suggest that this type of self-schema content may bear
more strongly on the course of depressive versus manic symptoms in bipolar disorder. In line with
this proposal, cognitive distortions (particularly within the interpersonal domain) mediated between
mania risk and depressive symptoms, rather than manic symptoms. This is somewhat unsurprising,
particularly since the nature of cognitive distortions seems to suggest that these are more likely to
lead to dysphoria or anxiety, rather than an elevated state.
Finally, the current research provided the first known investigation to consider self-referent
adaptive beliefs that may be relevant to reward sensitivity and goal dysregulation theories of mania
(Hillson, 1997). Results were somewhat inconclusive as to whether harmonious passion and adaptive
self-referent beliefs about success may be protective among individuals at heightened risk for mania.
In particular, only a non-significant trend in Study 1 indicated that greater harmonious passion
corresponded with attenuated manic symptoms at high levels of the HPS. In addition, greater
adaptive beliefs about success corresponded with fewer depressive symptoms at high levels of the
HPS in Study 2, but this finding only approached significance in Study 1. This line of inquiry
pertains to psychological resiliency in bipolar disorder, and the current findings point to a need to
further examine and more sensitively investigate cognitive mechanisms that may be protective
among those at heightened risk for mania.
In summary, the above findings identified several types of self-schema content that appear to
characterize mania. However, it should be noted that there was considerable overlap between
depressive symptoms and mania constructs in terms of self-schema content, with limited
characteristics showing unique associations with mania risk and symptoms.
Self-Schema Structure Findings. A core finding of this dissertation pertains to the
organization of self-referent information and mania. Specifically, replicated results across all three
studies suggest that the self-schema in mania has a structural component that is distinct from
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depression. Both the core measure tapping vulnerability to mania (hypomanic personality), as well as
manic symptoms, were consistently associated with positive self-schema content that was highly
interconnected. In contrast, and consistent with prior research (e.g., Dozois & Frewen, 2006), it was
also found across all three studies of the present dissertation that depression relates to the loose
organization of positive content. Furthermore, greater interconnectivity of positive self-schema
content also mediated between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms in Studies 1, 2, and 3
of the present dissertation, suggesting that this structural self-schema characteristic may help to
explain how mania risk translates to manic symptoms. Further evidence consistent with this notion
was obtained in Study 2, showing that high connectivity of positive self-schema content
prospectively predicted increases in manic symptoms over time.
The above findings concerning positive self-schema structure were consistent with
hypotheses, whereby it was posited that a densely interconnected subset of positively valenced, selfreferent information could help to explain the phenomenology of manic episodes (e.g., grandiosity,
energy). Specifically, the organization of positively valenced information would bear on the
accessibility of information about the self and thus, on the regulation of emotion. This differentiated
pattern of self-schema organization could also help to resolve commonalities regarding self-schema
content across mania and depression.
The present findings regarding self-schema structure expand the very limited existing
research on cognitive organization in bipolar disorder. Recall that a handful of investigations (Alatiq
et al., 2010; Power, de Jong, & Lloyd, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007) have documented that individuals
with bipolar disorder display a highly compartmentalized self-concept, in which self-aspects (e.g.,
family member, colleague, friend) show some polarization in terms of the valence of selfcharacteristics (i.e., predominantly positive or negative in nature). Similarly, the current findings
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suggest there is a pattern of highly interconnected, positively valenced content among individuals
with higher temperamental risk for mania.
It is important to clarify here that the present findings are not being interpreted as showing
that, in cases of mania, individuals have an overly positive self-view. As described previously in the
General Introduction and noted above, bipolar disorder appears to be characterized by predominantly
negative self-schema content, which has been observed during and outside of depressive episodes
(e.g., Alloy et al., 2009). Indeed, there was no significant association in the present research between
the hypomanic personality and the positive self-referent beliefs studied (e.g., “I like and feel proud of
my achievements”; Hillson, 1997). Further, recall that there was even a small association in Study 2
between the hypomanic personality and self-esteem, whereby individuals with greater mania risk
actually showed lower levels of self-esteem. Finally, the effect sizes associated with positive selfschema structure were quite small in magnitude, albeit, consistently replicated across all three
studies. As such, it is not posited that individuals with high mania risk hold themselves in too positive
a regard. Rather, it is theorized that positively valenced information about the self may be organized
in a problematic manner. One possibility is that individuals with temperamental risk for mania may
display a relatively small amount of positive self-referent information, however, this information
could be tightly organized in the self-schema structure.
Regarding this hypothesis that dense connectivity of positive self-schema content may be
restricted to a sub-network of self-relevant information, the current research did not find any direct
evidence for this proposal or elucidate the precise nature of highly interconnected, positive content.
Recall that it was predicted that beliefs in the achievement domain would show the highest levels of
self-schema connectivity, given previous research on reward sensitivity and goal-striving (e.g., Alloy
& Abramson, 2008; Johnson et al., 2012). However, across the three studies, results were mixed as to
whether the organization of achievement versus interpersonally-relevant content may be more
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predictive of the course of manic symptoms. For instance, recall that in Study 2, positive
interpersonal structure, instead of achievement structure, predicted future increases in manic
symptoms. Yet, as discussed in more detail below, positive achievement structure showed significant
interactions with life events in Study 2. Conversely, it appeared that positive self-schema structure, in
general, demonstrated more consistent patterns in the present research.
Several considerations may help to clarify why mania risk was not associated with a
consistent pattern of self-schema structure organization within a specific content domain. This could
have occurred since the measure of self-schema structure employed in the present research, the PDST
(Dozois & Dobson, 2001b), derives from research on depression. As such, the content areas
examined for depression may not hold the same meaning for mania. Moreover, as mentioned when
discussing the current self-schema content findings, a social evaluative component may, in fact, be
highly relevant to ideas of achievement or success in mania. As a result, the distinction between
achievement and interpersonal content may be more blurred. Thus, an important future direction for
this research would be to modify content of the PDST, such that new domains are considered
according to their hypothesized relevance to mania. Given previous research highlighting attitudes
regarding the importance of success and highly ambitious goals in relation to mania risk (e.g., Lam et
al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2012), this is an important content domain to examine.
Another domain of potential interest for future investigation concerns the intersection
between activation and self-appraisals. Previous research has considered how self-appraisals of
internal states may be implicated in the development of mania (e.g., Jones & Day, 2008; Mansell et
al., 2007). Specifically, these self-appraisals refer to the manner in which internal changes (e.g., high
energy, racing thoughts) are interpreted in a personally relevant manner (Jones, 2001). Extremely
positive self-appraisals of hypomanic states (e.g., interpreting increased energy as a sign of
impending success) have been implicated in the development of mania (Jones & Day, 2008; Jones et
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al., 2006). Appraisals of internal states were not examined in the present research, yet these may
relate to specific areas of content that are densely connected and would putatively lead to elevated
mood states.
A further consideration is that Study 2 in this dissertation found that the hypomanic
personality was associated with less temporal stability of self-schema structure. This supports the
notion that high connectivity of positive self-schema content may not reflect stably high self-views,
but rather dynamically changing self-appraisals. Similarly, consistent with past research on bipolar
disorder (e.g., van der Gucht et al., 2009), the current results for Study 2 also indicated that greater
temperamental risk for mania corresponded with fluctuations in self-esteem, even after accounting
for the influence of mood symptoms. In the present research, self-schema structure also predicted
momentary levels of self-esteem, which provides some empirical support for the theory that the
activation of differently organized networks corresponds with changes in self-liking, which would
ostensibly impact one’s mood state.
Future research could examine how self-schema instability findings may relate to different
types of self-appraisals. One consideration is that the measurement of self-schema structure may not
only capture an individual’s firm beliefs (e.g. their actual self-views), but also their aspirations or
expectations for themselves (e.g., their ideal self-views). This possibility seems particularly viable in
mania, given the previously described research on bipolar disorder, perfectionism, and the overendorsement of highly ambitious goals (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Lam et al., 2004). In this regard, selfdiscrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) may also be quite relevant to mania, as this approach postulates
that there are different domains of self-conceptualization. Here, the ‘actual-self’ refers to one’s
actual, self-perceived qualities, whereas the ‘ideal-self’ and ‘ought-self’ encompass the qualities a
person wishes or feels obliged to have, respectively.
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Researchers have more recently considered self-discrepancy theory in relation to bipolar
disorder (Alatiq et al., 2010; Bentall et al., 2005). Although evidence suggests that self-discrepancies
are generally quite stable over time (Strauman, 1996), one study examined self-discrepancy over
different phases of bipolar illness (Bentall et al., 2005). These investigators found that bipolar
depressed patients exhibited greater discrepancy between their actual and ideal-selves compared to
manic, hypomanic, and remitted bipolar disorder patients and healthy control participants. A
converse relationship was demonstrated amongst (hypo)manic patients, who reported abnormally low
levels of discrepancy between their actual, ideal and ought-selves compared to the other groups.
These results suggest that how individuals with bipolar disorder view themselves against their
idealized standard of being is subject to change. In addition, periods of (hypo)mania may be
associated with appraisals that individuals are closer to idealized standards of being (Bentall et al.,
2005). Thus, it may be advisable for future studies of mania risk to differentiate between beliefs
regarding one’s current self-appraisals, versus appraisals pertaining to one’s future potential or
idealized outcomes; and then examine the organization of these beliefs.
Contrary to hypotheses, despite some inconsistent associations between the HPS and negative
self-schema structure, the current project did not find that mania risk robustly predicted the
organization of negative self-schema content. Recall that it was hypothesized that some areas of
negative self-schema content would show high connectivity, similar to the pattern shown for
depression. This hypothesis stemmed from the fact that individuals with a history of mania also
frequently experience depressive symptoms (Akiskal et al., 2000). Although there was some weak
evidence for these expected associations between mania risk and negative self-schema structure
across the three studies, this pattern was less clearly demonstrated compared to that for positive selfschema structure.
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There are several possible explanations for why the current results do not support this
hypothesis. For one, since there is evidence to suggest that vulnerability mechanisms in mania and
depression are separable (e.g., McGuffin et al, 2003), it is possible that high connectivity of negative
self-schema content is specific to depressive symptoms in cases of bipolar disorder. Thus, this
increased consolidation of negative self-schema content may not be observed when examining the
hypomanic personality, alone, and particularly when also accounting for the influence of depressive
symptoms. In order to better understand the organization of negative self-beliefs among individuals
with bipolar disorder, a more sensitive design would be informative, which contrasts the self-schema
structure of individuals with a history of mania and depression, individuals with a history of mania
alone, and individuals with a history of unipolar depression.
Another possible explanation for these findings pertains to the previous consideration
regarding self-schema measurement and potentially tapping idealized ways of being (Higgins, 1967).
Since results of the current research suggest that greater mania risk was associated with unstable
measurement of negative achievement structure, there is some indication that dynamic factors may be
influencing the apparent organization of negative self-beliefs. Finally, the current research may not
have captured the domain in which negative self-schema content may show high levels of
connectivity. For instance, the importance of negative self-appraisals of internal states, in addition to
positive appraisals, has also been considered in relation to bipolar disorder (e.g., Mansell et al.,
2007). Negative appraisals of (hypo)manic symptoms could relate to fears such as being out of
control and on the verge of breakdown (Mansell et al., 2006). Moreover, in line with reward
sensitivity and goal dysregulation models (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012), negative content that pertains to
failing to meet one’s high standards or future aspirations may also be relevant to mania. As such,
these important subsets of beliefs should also be considered in future studies of self-schema
organization in mania.
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One major limitation of the current research is that it was conducted with non-clinical
samples. As mentioned in the General Introduction, there are advantages to a research design that
uses risk markers rather than remitted diagnostic status to study vulnerability to psychopathology. In
addition, the HPS (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), as a measure reflecting risk for mania, has been
extensively used in contemporary psychological research on mania (e.g., Kim et al., 2017;
Pornpattananangkul et al., 2015). However, it is still critical that future research be conducted among
clinical samples of bipolar disorder, in order to determine whether individuals exhibit similar selfschema characteristics as identified by the current investigation. Another future direction of this
research would involve examining whether this project’s findings would extend to various different
presentations of mania (e.g., manic episodes with psychotic features), or whether differences exist
among certain groups (e.g., bipolar I versus bipolar II disorder). In addition, contrasting self-schema
content and structure displayed by individuals with bipolar disorder compared to similar clinical
presentations (e.g., major depressive disorder, schizophrenia), would also be important to further
understand unique and shared aspects of psychological vulnerability.
Mood Induction Findings
The present dissertation also considered whether mood induction procedures (MIPs) appear to
impact the study of self-schema content associated with mania. Contrary to tentative hypotheses,
there was not a significant effect of positive mood induction, whereby individuals were asked to
imagine that they had achieved an important goal. As such, these null findings suggest that the MIP
was not necessary to detect associations between mania and the specific types of self-schema content
studied in the current dissertation. Thus, one possibility is that mood priming may not be required for
the study of self-schema content characterizing mania. However, it is important to recognize that
there were several limitations of the current assessment of MIPs. First, it cannot be determined how
long presumed effects of the MIP lasted in the present investigation. Thus, it is unclear whether
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certain measures administered further after the mood induction may have shown significant MIP
impact, if they had been presented closer in time to the induction. As such, a more rigorous test of
MIPs is still warranted, particularly since very limited research has thus far assessed the effects of
mood priming on the study of self-schema characteristics in mania.
Similarly, since the current investigation was the first test of this MIP, it is not clear whether
the use of this procedure was relevant to the activation of self-schema components associated with
mania. In the future, it would be important to compare and contrast the effects of other possible MIPs
(e.g., negative mood prime), before ruling out the importance of mood priming for the study of selfschema characteristics associated with mania.
Finally, an effect of the MIP was not examined for self-schema structure, since existing
research suggests that this is a more stable characteristic of the self-schema (e.g., Dozois & Dobson,
2001a). As such, mood priming is likely not necessary to study self-schema organization. However,
given the current results pertaining to reduced temporal stability of self-schema structure in mania, it
would be important to examine whether there might be an impact of mood priming on the
momentary, perceptible organization of self-beliefs. One possibility is that highly interconnected
networks of positive content may become even more discernible when activated by mania-relevant
triggers, which would help to explain variability associated with repeated measurement of selfschema structure among individuals at high mania risk. This pattern would be consistent with the
following results concerning interactions between positive self-schema structure and life events.
Findings for Interactions between Life Events and Self-Schema Components
This dissertation applied the cognitive vulnerability-stress framework to mania by examining
both the content and structure of self-schemas, as well as providing a preliminary investigation of the
interplay between self-schema components and life events. Consistent with previous research, the
current results implicate the role of positive life events in the course of manic symptoms. Across
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Studies 2 and 3, there were main effects of positive life events, in which generally positive and goal
attainment events, in particular, predicted concurrent and prospective increases in manic symptoms.
Most importantly, initial support was also provided in Studies 2 and 3 for a cognitive vulnerabilitystress framework, whereby positive self-schema structure significantly interacted with positive life
events. Specifically, high frequency and impact of positive life events predicted concurrent or future
increases in manic symptoms, particularly among individuals who showed high interconnectivity of
positive self-schema content. Study 3 also found that this interaction between positive self-schema
structure and positive life events was only observed at high levels of mania risk.
The above findings support the current literature regarding the impact of life events in bipolar
disorder (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Nusslock et al., 2007), and how this pattern is differentiated
from depression (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008a), by continuing to show that certain positive versus
negative events predict the course of manic symptoms. The current project also extends existing
research by demonstrating that positive life events interact with the organization of positive selfbeliefs to predict manic symptoms. It is theorized that this relation was observed because certain
positive events, particularly those related to activation and goal-striving, triggered highly
interconnected networks of positively valenced, self-referent information. It is postulated that these
events may play such a role because they provide momentary evidence to individuals regarding
dysfunctional beliefs about positive emotion, success, or power, such that one is capable of anything
(Lam et al., 2004; Mansell et al., 2007). Since this positive self-schema content is tightly organized,
activation of such a network would lead to widespread activation of similar beliefs or ideas about
oneself, which would ostensibly lead to high levels of positive emotion and energy, in turn.
Such elevations in mood and energy could then initiate a feedback loop, in which positive
self-schema content continues to be activated. This proposal is supported by the previously reviewed
research on bipolar disorder and responses to positive affect, in which individuals with a history or
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risk for mania are likely to respond to positive affect with positive self-focused rumination (e.g., Raes
et al., 2010). Moreover, such changes in cognition would likely be accompanied by behavioural
responses. Existing research on mania suggests that high levels of activation could lead to momentary
behaviour that continues to propel mood upwards, otherwise referred to as ‘ascent behaviours’ (e.g.,
ingesting stimulants, increasing activity; Mansell et al., 2007). This would be particularly relevant if
the content of activated cognitions pertains to positive self-appraisals of elevated states (Mansell et
al., 2007). As such, a vicious cycle could be created, in which the repetitive activation of cognitions
and triggering of ascent behaviours give rise to manic symptomatology.
In terms of more specific types of positive events, consistent with hypotheses, both goal
attainment events and BAS-activating events shared significant interactions with self-schema
structure in Studies 2 and 3, respectively. Although the expected pattern was shown for goal
attainment events, BAS-activating events did not show a significant, sensitization effect regarding
their association with manic symptoms at high levels of mania risk and positive self-schema
connectivity. Conversely, it was noted that greater BAS-activating events in Study 3 unexpectedly
predicted fewer manic symptoms at high levels of mania risk, when there were also low levels of
connectivity for positive content. It is unclear what this pattern of findings could mean concerning
the impact of BAS events among individuals at high mania risk. One possible interpretation is that
highly interconnected, positive self-beliefs play an important role in determining the impact of BAS
events on manic symptoms, and without this characteristic, individuals who display high
temperamental risk for mania would not show high levels of manic symptomatology within the
context of these events.
Another consideration is that the nature of BAS-Activating events is quite different from
general positive and goal attainment events, in that BAS-Activating events may not always be
positive or as noticeable as achievement events (e.g., studying for an upcoming exam, planning a
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party, having an argument with a family member). As such, a more sensitive design may be required
to accurately assess BAS-activating events experienced by participants, along dimensions that are
proposed to be significant to mania. In this regard, a further limitation of the present dissertation is
that an interview method was not used to contextualize life events reported by participants, and more
sensitively rate their impact. As such, an important future direction of this research would be to
examine interactions between life events and self-schema structure using a more rigorous study
design that incorporates a life events interview.
As previously discussed, another limitation of this dissertation is that this research was not
conducted with clinical samples of bipolar disorder. Since the role of mania risk was demonstrated in
significant interactions with life events and schema structure when a larger sample was examined in
Study 3, it may be the case that there was not sufficient power in Study 2 to examine differences
across levels of mania risk within moderation analyses. However, it would be important to replicate
these findings and determine whether they can generalize to different expressions of mania.
Regarding interactions between life events and specific domains of self-schema structure, the
current findings were mixed as to whether the organization of achievement or interpersonal content
was more critical. In line with initial hypotheses, there was slightly more support for the role of
achievement self-schema structure in interactions with life events, with both Study 2 and 3 showing
significant results for this domain of self-schema content. However, findings of Study 3 also
indicated that significant interactions with life events involved interpersonal self-schema structure.
Of note, there were significantly more female participants than male participants in Study 3,
compared to Study 2 where the gender distribution was more balanced. Thus, one possibility is that
gender differences may help to explain this discrepancy across Studies 2 and 3. Another possibility,
as discussed in the first section of this General Discussion, is that the self-schema structure domains
examined in the present dissertation may not capture the most relevant content for mania. Thus, it is
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important that future research consider other content domains of self-schema structure and how these
may moderate the impact of life events on manic symptoms. Another future direction of the current
research involves examining gender differences in relation to self-schema characteristics associated
with mania.
Finally, the results of this dissertation indicated that self-schema structure was more
important than content for moderating the relation between positive life events and manic symptoms.
Contrary to results for structure, none of the content measures studied interacted with life events to
predict concurrent or prospective increases in manic symptoms. However, since only Study 3
examined interactions between life events and self-schema content, it is important to replicate this
finding. Nevertheless, the current results suggest that self-schema structure may be more informative
for the course of manic symptoms from a cognitive vulnerability-stress perspective. This finding
could relate to existing research on self-schema structure, indicating that it is a more enduring
characteristic and more predictive of relapse in depression compared to self-schema content (e.g.,
Dozois, 2007). Since substantial overlap exists between mania and depression in terms of the selfschema content that appears to characterize these presentations, self-schema structure may also be a
more distinguishing feature of cognitive vulnerability to mania. Future research is needed to clarify
the relative importance of self-schema structure versus content within the context of mania.
Clinical Implications
Given the limitations of this research, only tentative statements can be made regarding the
generalizability of these findings to cases of bipolar disorder and the clinical implications of this
work. However, the present results linking mania to self-schema structure irregularities fit within a
broader literature suggesting that self-concept disturbance characterizes bipolar disorder (e.g.,
dysfunctional attitudes about success; highly fluctuating levels of self-esteem; unstable actual versus
idealized self-views) (e.g., Bentall et al., 2006; Lam et al., 2004; van der Gucht et al., 2009). Overall,
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this evidence indicates that an important therapeutic goal would be to support patients in exploring
and challenging maladaptive views of oneself, in order to develop a more balanced and adaptive selfunderstanding. This overarching goal is consistent with current applications of cognitive-behavioural
therapy (CBT) for bipolar disorder (Oud et al., 2016).
More specifically, if it is the case that individuals prone to mania show a set of positive
beliefs that are temporally unstable and tightly organized, this could have important negative
consequences for psychological well-being. In particular, this pattern suggests that individuals only
have select moments in which they feel positively about themselves and that this is not consistently
experienced. This proposal is also corroborated by documented associations between mania and the
prevalence of negative self-beliefs and fluctuating self-esteem levels (e.g., Bentall et al., 2011;
Adams et al., 2014). Further, activation of highly interconnected networks of positive self-schema
content would theoretically lead to momentary positive self-appraisals that are extreme. This would
contribute to drastically different views of the self from moment to moment, which would reasonably
correspond with rapid changes in mood. Alternatively, adopting a more generalized and balanced
positive self-view would likely contribute to more stable moods and higher levels of well-being. As
such, therapeutic work could support individuals in generalizing and balancing positive self-beliefs
so they are more temporally stable and less polarized regarding their organization.
If future research can extend this work and provide further support for self-schema structure
as a vulnerability marker for mania, there would also be helpful applications to psychological
assessment. For instance, a tool such as the PDST (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b) could be
adapted for use in a clinical context, particularly if more specific domains of structure can be
identified for mania. Changes in the measurement of self-schema structure (e.g., greater temporal
stability) could be used to gauge the effectiveness of clinical interventions for bipolar disorder (e.g.,
psychotropic drugs, psychological treatments), particularly in relation to manic symptoms.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Psychological Distance Scaling Task – Word List
Interpersonal Positive
Admired, Caring, Comforted, Comical, Considerate, Desirable, Devoted, Encouraged, Generous,
Humorous, Joyful, Kind, Playful, Outgoing, Neighbourly, Romantic, Supported, Trustworthy,
Understanding, Valuable
Interpersonal Negative
Alone, Annoying, Conceited, Demanding, Dependent, Deserted, Shy, Forsaken, Dull, Lonely,
Overbearing, Pushy, Quarrelsome, Rejected, Resentful, Shunned, Snobbish, Unfriendly, Unloved,
Unwanted
Achievement Positive
Achieving, Ambitious, Capable, Driven, Eager, Efficient, Exceptional, Gifted, Impressive,
Intelligent, Extraordinary, Outstanding, Marvellous, Remarkable, Respected, Skillful, Striving,
Successful, Superior, Talented
Achievement Negative
Aimless, Apathetic, Beaten, Criticized, Defeated, Deficient, Destroyed, Failure, Hasty, Helpless,
Hurried, Inadequate, Incompetent, Inferior, Insignificant, Lazy, Stagnant, Stupid, Useless, Worthless
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Appendix B: Mood Induction Procedures
POSITIVE MOOD INDUCTION:
In this part of the experiment, we will ask you to participate in an exercise that is meant to create a
temporary positive mood state. We’d like you to think about a goal that is important to you and
imagine that you have achieved it. This goal could be anything – it could be a success in the
workplace, achieving a dream in a love or family relationship, an achievement of recognition for
something that is important to you, or many other things.
Bring to mind a goal that is very important to you and which would make you very happy if you
achieved it. First take some time to describe this goal.
What about your goal makes it important to you?
What would you think and feel if you achieved it?
Are there other people there? What would you see, hear, smell, feel, etc?
Now we’re going to ask you to spend some time imagining that you have achieved this goal.
First, try and clear your mind for 30 seconds. When you hear the bell, begin imagining this scenario.
To help create a happy mood, please try to vividly imagine achieving this goal and how this would
make you feel. When you hear the bell a second time, please answer the questions onscreen.
(Participants visualize for 2 minutes)
Manipulation check:
How did you feel while imagining that you achieved this goal? (-4 to 4 scale, where -4 is extremely
negative, 0 Is neutral and 4 is extremely positive)
Did you think of anything else besides achieving your goal just now?
What emotions did you feel, if any?
Name the emotion and rate it on a 0-8 scale, where 0 Is no emotion and 8 is the strongest
manifestation of that emotion in your entire life.
NEUTRAL EMOTION INDUCTION:
In this part of the experiment, we will ask you to participate in mental imagery exercise. We’d like
you to think about doing some routine shopping in a store and imagine that you are doing it in this
moment. The type of shopping should be part of your regular routine – such as going to a grocery
store, drug store, etc.
Bring to mind an example of regular shopping you do as part of your living routine. First take some
time to describe this situation.
What store and type of shopping are you thinking of?
What would you think and feel while doing the shopping?
Are there other people there? What would you see, hear, smell, feel, etc?
Now we’re going to ask you to spend some time imagining that you are doing this shopping in the
store.
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First, try and clear your mind for 30 seconds. When you hear the bell, begin imagining this scenario.
To help to create the mental imagery, please try to vividly imagine you are doing this shopping and
how this would make you feel. When you hear the bell a second time, please answer the questions
onscreen.
(Participants visualize for 2 minutes)
Manipulation check:
How did you feel while imagining that you were shopping? (-4 to 4 scale, where -4 is extremely
negative, 0 Is neutral and 4 is extremely positive)
Did you think of anything else besides doing this routine shopping just now?
What emotions did you feel, if any?
Name the emotion and rate it on a 0-8 scale, where 0 Is no emotion and 8 is the strongest
manifestation of that emotion in your entire life.
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Appendix C: Study 1 and 2 Ethics Approval Notice
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Appendix D: Simple Correlations among Study 1 Major Measures
Correlations between the Mania and Mood Symptomatology Measures

HPS

ASRM

DASS-21

.47**

.15*

Activation
Correlations between the Self-Schema Content Measures.
DAS
DAS
CDS-I

CDS-I

CDS-A PBS

PS- H

PS-O

.20*** .17*** .21*** .12*

.33*** .42*** .22*** .23***

.84*** -.34*** -.17**

CDS-A

-.35*** -.14**

PBS

.30*** .23*** .17**

.39***

.30*** .21*** .10*

.41***

.53*** .04

PS-H

MPS-SF MPS-O MPS-S

.13**

.18*** .07

PS-O

.

.05

-.32***

-.14**

-.23**

.18*** .19*** .29***

MS-SF

.56*** .43***

MS-O

.42***

Correlations between the Self-Schema Structure Domains.
PDST-AP
PDST-AP

PDST-AN

PDST-IP

PDST-IN

-.33***

.71***

-.10

-.26***

.54***

PDST-AN
PDST-IP

-.19**

Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 =
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21, Depression subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale,
Goal Attainment Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Interpersonal Subscale; CDS-A =
Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale,
Fulfillment Subscale; PS-O = Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious
Subscale; MPS-S = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O =
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional
Perfectionism Scale, Socially Prescribed Subscale; PDST = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP =
Achievement Positive; AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal
Negative. ***p < .001, **p <.0, *p < .05.
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Appendix E: Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Reverse Models
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Positive
Perfectionism

0.14**
0.23***
0.25***

0.02
0.14**

Obsessive
Passion
Positive

0.38***

Manic Symptoms

Mania Risk
0.47*** (0.32***)

-0.27***

Positive
Structure
Positive

-0.09

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect
is presented in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional
Attitudes, β = -.00; Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism, β = .03*; Obsessive Passion, β =
.09*; Positive Structure, β = .02; Total indirect effect, β = .14*. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p
< .001.

0.45***

Depressive
Symptoms

Achievement
Cognitive
Distortions

-0.09

Mania Risk
0.10* (0.01)

0.45***

Interpersonal
Cognitive
Distortions

0.30***

Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect
is presented in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement
Cognitive Distortions, β = -.04; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .14*; Total
indirect effect, β = .09*. *p < .05, ***p < .001.
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Appendix F: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics
Time 1 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures
Category
Mania

Measure

M

SD

Range

2.09

2.39

0-9

.80

4.48

4.39

0-20

.84

4.63

5.16

0-21

.94

M

SD

Range

5.77

4.33

0-19

.83

3.46

4.27

0-21

.93

PDST Overall Positive 0.81

0.66

-1.46-2.96

PDST Overall Negative 2.32

1.02

-0.21-4.59

PDST-AP

0.45

0.44

-0.75-2.20

PDST-AN

1.40

0.60

-0.05-2.50

PDST-IP

0.37

0.28

-0.71-1.29

PDST-IN

1.27

0.56

-0.19-2.42

Positive

19.74

19.71

0-104

Goal Attainment

13.44

15.17

0-85

BAS-Activating

22.25

23.14

0-123

Negative

52.56

69.81

0-315

BAS-Deactivating

47.81

63.74

0-287

RSEI Total

32.50

6.14

10-40

HPS Activation

Mood Symptomatology ASRM
DASS-21

Reliability

Time 2 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures
Category

Measure

Mood Symptomatology ASRM
DASS-21
Self-Schema Structure

Life Events

Self-Esteem

148

Reliability

.92

Time 3 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures
Category

Measure

M

SD

Range

5.18

4.18

0-16

.80

DASS-21

3.96

5.01

0-21

.94

CDS-A

39.38

12.63

10-70

.88

CDS-I

39.50

12.27

10-70

.87

PBS

38.09

8.53

7-49

.91

PDST Overall Positive 0.82

0.58

-0.87-2.85

PDST Overall Negative 2.60

0.97

0.51-4.68

PDST-AP

0.46

0.40

-0.46-2.16

PDST-AN

1.27

0.61

0.10-2.51

PDST-IP

0.37

0.29

-0.41-1.43

PDST-IN

1.31

0.56

-0.49-2.49

RSEI Total

31.65

7.03

10-40

M

SD

Range

5.54

4.68

0-16

.83

DASS-21

3.97

4.93

0-21

.95

Positive

16.98

16.14

0-60

Goal Attainment

11.26

12.74

0-55

BAS-Activating

18.42

19.96

0-88

Negative

45.38

56.03

0-265

BAS-Deactivating

41.33

51.44

0-265

RSEI Total

32.00

7.10

10-40

Mood Symptomatology ASRM

Self-Schema Content

Self-Schema Structure

Self-Esteem

Reliability

.94

Time 4 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures
Category

Measure

Mood Symptomatology ASRM

Life Events

Self-Esteem

149

Reliability

.94

Other Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures
Category

M

SD

Range

4.27

4.52

0-20

Average Depressive Symptoms 4.93
T1-T4

5.46

0-21

PDST Positive Difference
T2-T3

0.33

0.34

0-2.13

PDST Negative Difference
T2-T3

0.38

0.27

0.01-0.27

PDST AP Difference
T2-T3

0.22

0.20

0-0.11

PDST AN Difference
T2-T3

0.41

0.40

0-1.70

PDST IP Difference
T2-T3

0.16

0.18

0-1.09

PDST IN Difference
T2-T3

0.38

0.29

0.01-1.09

Self-Esteem Variability
T2-T4

1.77

1.67

0-7.78

Average Self-Esteem
T2-T4

31.76

6.36

10-40

Average Manic Symptoms
T1-T4

Note. N = 438-455 for all measures. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, Activation subscale;
ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales – 21,
Depression Subscale; PSDT = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP = Achievement Positive;
AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal Negative; CDS-A =
Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale,
Interpersonal Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, Fulfillment Subscale; RSEI =
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 3, T4 = Time 4.
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Appendix G: Study 2 Simple Correlations between Mood Symptoms and Life Events
Correlations between Positive Life Events at Time 2 and Manic Symptoms.

Manic T2
Manic T3
Manic T4
Average Manic

Positive T2
.27**
.17+
.21*
.35**

BAS-Activating T2
.16+
.08
.09
.25**

Goal Attainment T2
.28**
.11
.23*
.33**

Correlations between Positive Life Events at Time 4 and Manic Symptoms.
Manic T4
Average Manic

Positive T4
.37**
.35**

BAS-Activating T4
.06
.12

Goal Attainment T4
.39**
.39**

Correlations between Negative Life Events and Manic Symptoms.

Manic T2
Manic T3
Manic T4
Average

Negative T2
.04
.00
.00
.13

BAS-Deactivating
T2
.05
.01
.02
.14

Negative T4

BASDeactivating T4

-.07
.04

-.05
.05

Correlations between Negative Life Events and Depressive Symptoms.
Negative T2
Depression T2
Depression T3
Depression T4
Average

.52**
.43**
.48**
.51**

BAS-Deactivating
T2
.53**
.45**
.50**
.52**

Negative T4

BASDeactivating T4

.51**
.52**

.52**
.53**

Notes. Manic = Manic symptoms; T2= Time 2; T3 = Time 3; T4 = Time 4; Average Manic =
Average number of manic symptoms reported across the entire study; Positive = General Positive
Life Events; BAS-Activating = BAS-Activating Events; Goal Attainment = Goal Attainment Events;
Depression= Depressive symptoms; Average Depression = Average number of depressive symptoms
reported across the entire study; Negative = General Negative Life Events; BAS-Deactivating =
BAS-Deactivating Events. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, + = p < .08
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Appendix H: Study 3 Ethics Approval Notice
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Appendix I: Study 3 Descriptive Statistics
Category
Mania

Measure

M

SD

Range

3.25

2.54

0-9

.86

4.27

4.52

0-20

.80

DASS-21

4.93

5.46

0-21

.90

DAS

26.37

6.79

6-42

.80

PS-O

19.39

8.17

6-42

.83

PS-H

29.43

6.84

12-42

.81

PDST Overall Positive 0.86

0.49

-1.35-3.56

PDST Overall Negative 2.41

0.90

-0.52-5.03

PDST-AP

0.49

0.34

-0.65-2.31

PDST-AN

1.27

0.55

-0.36-2.64

PDST-IP

0.38

0.21

-0.66-1.53

PDST-IN

1.22

0.47

-0.20-2.55

Positive

53.40

31.57

0-186

Goal Attainment

29.30

20.13

0-113

BAS-Activating

48.30

30.44

0-153

Negative

58.93

48.10

0-277

BAS-Deactivating

45.77

40.73

0-237

HPS Activation

Mood Symptomatology ASRM

Self-Schema Content

Self-Schema Structure

Life Events
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Appendix J: Study 3 Moderation Results for Self-Schema Content
Three-Way Interactions: Positive Events
Self-Schema Content

β

Model

Dysfunctional Attitudes –
Goal Attainment

HPS (.30)***
DAS (.11)**
LES Positive (.11)**
HPSxDAS (.02)
HPSxLES (-.02)
DASxLES (-.01)
HPSxDASxLES (.01)

F = 11.42, R2 = 13, p < .001

Obsessive Passion

HPS (.30)***
Obsessive (.11)**
LES Goal (.13)**
HPSxObsessive (.02)
HPSxLES (.01)
ObsessivexLES (-.01)
HPSxObsessivexLES (-.04)

F = 11.72, R2 = 13, p < .001

Three-Way Interactions: Goal Attainment Events
Self-Schema Content

β

Model

Dysfunctional Attitudes –
Goal Attainment

HPS (.30)***
DAS (.11)**
LES Positive (.11)**
HPSxDAS (.01)
HPSxLES (-.01)
DASxLES (-.02)
HPSxDASxLES (.01)

F = 11.42, R2 = 13, p < .001

Obsessive Passion

HPS (.29)***
Obsessive (.10)*
LES Goal (.12)**
HPSxObsessive (-.05)
HPSxLES (.01)
ObsessivexLES (-.02)
HPSxObsessjvexLES (.04)

F = 11.69, R2 = 13, p < .001

Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment
subscale; LES – Life Events Scale; Obsessive = Obsessive Passion; Positive = Positive Events; Goal
= Goal Attainment Events. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression
coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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